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Subjective social status is an individual’s self-perceived rank in society in terms 
of education, occupation, and income. Lower subjective status has been linked to a 
variety of negative physical, psychological, and social outcomes. It has been argued that 
subjective status is largely an unbiased assessment of one’s actual socioeconomic 
standing. However, the hypothesis of the present research is that subjective status may 
also be influenced by personality (i.e., neuroticism, extraversion, and perceived control) 
as well as by previous illness. Four studies were conducted. The study reported in 
Chapter 2 was a 2-year longitudinal study of older adults that examined how neuroticism 
may be linked to subjective status. The findings were that more neurotic individuals had 
poorer occupational attainment, poorer salaries, and worse illness, all of which was 
associated with lower subjective status. More neurotic individuals reported greater acute 
negative affect but negative affect was unrelated to subjective status. The study reported 
in Chapter 3 examined how subjective status and recent medical interventions may be 
related. As expected, those individuals who had undergone more medical interventions in 
the preceding year went on to report lower subjective status. However, initial subjective 
status was unrelated to subsequent number of medical interventions. In Chapter 4, the 
relation between subjective status and perceived control was examined in samples of 
young and old adults. For young adults, perceived control and subjective status were 
unrelated in a model that included personality and socioeconomic status. In addition, 
higher extraversion was linked to higher subjective status, whereas neuroticism was 
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unrelated to subjective status for young adults. For older adults, perceived control 
positively predicted subjective status, though the strength of association was relatively 
weak after accounting for personality and socioeconomic status. An alternative account in 
which subjective status predicted perceived control was not supported by the data. Across 
four studies, subjective status was influenced by a variety of factors including 
neuroticism, extraversion, perceived control, and preceding health problems. Doubts are 
raised concerning the impact of subjective status, particularly since so few studies of 
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 Human beings engage in numerous types of social relations which are often 
characterized by differences in power and influence. Indeed, it can be argued that a 
principal form of social relation is that of authority ranking in which individuals may 
recognize each other as superior or subordinate (Fiske, 1992). These relations of authority 
ranking can extend over networks of individuals (Mazur, 2005), in which a particular 
individual may be subordinate to some individuals and superior to others. An individual’s 
location within such a wider hierarchy can be conceptualized as that individual’s social 
status.  
Social status is an influential construct in social psychology that has been 
operationalized in a variety of different ways. Three principal forms of social status can 
be identified. First, individuals differ in their rank within proximal social environments. 
For example, individuals differ in how much respect and influence they may have within 
their immediate peer group. These are differences in face to face status. Second, 
individuals differ in terms of their absolute levels of education, occupation, and income, 
which collectively have been identified as indicators of socioeconomic status (SES; 
Rogers & Onge, 2007). Third, individuals differ in how they perceive their relative level 
of education, occupation, and income in society, and these perceptions together constitute 
subjective social status (Adler, Epel, Castellazzo, & Ickovics, 2000). Note that subjective 
social status consists of perceptions of one’s relative SES and these perceptions are not 
necessarily accurate. It is important to distinguish individuals’ face to face status, their 
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SES, and their subjective social status because these three types of status may differ in 
their determinants and consequences. 
 Differences in face to face status are ubiquitous in human social interactions, and 
the human capacity to function within such hierarchies may have an evolutionary origin. 
Indeed, there are several physiological, cognitive, and affective systems that make human 
beings acutely sensitive to any changes in status (their own or of others) within their peer 
groups (Cummins, 2005), and such systems are likely inherited from our hunter-gatherer 
ancestors. Given this evolutionary argument, one would expect to see face to face status 
differences in other species. In fact, relations of dominance and submission can be found 
throughout the animal kingdom (Mazur, 2005). Face to face status differences have 
important consequences on the competition for resources among conspecifics. In many 
animal species, there are higher status individuals that have first access to food and 
mates, and there are lower status conspecifics who defer to these high status individuals. 
This relation of dominance and submission represents an adaptive response to the high 
costs of outright aggression and competition, and provides an effective compromise 
which benefits both the superior and subordinate.  
 Evidence for the importance of face to face status for social living can be found in 
how early such status concerns emerge in human development. It has been argued that 
very young children engage in various strategies aimed at increasing their social 
dominance and resources (Hawley, 1999). Those children who rise to the top of their peer 
group receive disproportionate attention from their peers, which mimics the increased 
attention paid to high status animals such as is found within the higher primates. These 
effects may seem based on inherited tendencies but are also open to socialisation, as the 
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strategies by which children receive status from their peers change with time in the 
direction of greater pro-sociality (Hawley, 1999). There may be a variety of 
environmental inputs which may influence which behavioural strategies children select to 
manage their position within face to face status hierarchies. These inputs may include the 
availability of resources in early childhood, parental style, and cultural influences 
(Bugental, 2000). 
Not only do children seem to seek status in the eyes of their peers, but at a young 
age they begin to explicitly understand their own ranking. For instance, children begin to 
demonstrate accuracy in assessing their own standing in peer groups as early as the third 
grade (Krantz & Burton, 1986). These changes suggest that children quickly gain the 
ability to understand that there are hierarchies present in life and such hierarchies are 
important. Indeed, research has shown that teenagers’ rank in the social hierarchies 
present in sports teams, academic settings, and peer groups have a variety of effects on 
physiological functioning (West, Sweeting, Young, & Kelly, 2010), and such effects 
seem more pronounced for these immediate face to face hierarchies than for the SES of 
these teenagers. The ability to effectively know one’s place in a status hierarchy is 
important, as there are negative social consequences for those individuals who see 
themselves as having higher status than is afforded to them by their peers (Anderson, 
Srivastava, Beer, Spataro, & Chatman, 2006).  
The capacity to manage status hierarchies involves not only assessing one’s own 
status but also the status of others. Individuals are able to form assessments of each other 
in terms of status-related characteristics, such as age, gender, and physical attractiveness 
(Brewer & Lui, 1989; Willis & Todorov, 2006), and such judgments occur relatively 
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quickly. Many status-related cues are detected nonconsciously and automatically (Smith 
& Galinsky, 2010). The cues by which humans detect and respond to differences in 
power include patterns of gaze, body posture, height, spatial location (i.e., individuals 
who are higher up relative to the observer are seen as having greater power), and general 
size. Given that many of these cues are processed rapidly and in a non-conscious manner, 
the implication is that while individuals can accurately assess another individual’s status, 
they may not be able to explicitly access the cues by which they make such a judgment 
(Smith & Galinsky, 2010).  
In contrast to the local nature of face to face hierarchies, the SES hierarchy is 
immense (encompassing whole societies), and one of the broadest status networks to 
which humans belong (Mazur, 2005). In the present thesis, SES is conceptualized as an 
individual’s objective level of influence, prestige, and access to resources in society at 
large. Education, occupation, and income are three principal indicators of SES (Rogers & 
Onge, 2007). Note, however that there has been substantial debate as to how to best 
operationalize socioeconomic status (Oakes & Rossi, 2003; Shavers, 2007). Whereas 
almost all measures of SES make reference to at least one of the three previously 
mentioned indicators (i.e., education, occupation, and income), there remains substantial 
diversity in how these indicators are conceptualized to contribute to SES, in how they are 
concretely measured, and in how they are individually weighted as facets of SES (Oakes 
& Rossi, 2003). Nevertheless, education, occupation, and income remain moderately to 
strongly positively intercorrelated (e.g., Singh-Manoux, Adler, & Marmot, 2003), and 
can be argued to cohere together in a meaningful way.  In addition to these indicators, 
other indicators of SES have been identified such as personal wealth, family income, 
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neighbourhood per capita income, neighbourhood property value, and so on (Shavers, 
2007). Given the variety of indicators available with which to measure SES, researchers 
may be guided by the particularities of their research question, and by pragmatic 
considerations in which measures they ultimately choose.  
Differences in SES have been identified as predicting important physical and 
psychological outcomes. For example, a recent American Psychological Association 
taskforce on SES (2006) identified several areas in which SES may be influential. 
Individuals with higher SES attain better social support, greater perceived control, better 
access to health care, have less negative health behaviors, and work in jobs with better 
quality of work life. In short, there are numerous benefits to having higher SES. 
 Many of the health effects of SES have not just been found with the very rich or 
very poor but extend across the entirety of the SES gradient (Adler et al., 1994). These 
findings highlight the depth of the influence of SES on health. Adler and colleagues 
(1994) reviewed a variety of explanations for the health effects of SES. First, higher SES 
individuals may act in ways to promote their health, including smoking less and engaging 
in greater physical activity. Second, higher SES individuals may have better mental 
health such as less depression and lower hostility, both of which are potential risk factors 
for future physical illness. Third, higher SES individuals may experience less stress both 
because they encounter less negative events in their environments and because they have 
greater resources available to deal with stressors as they arise. Fourth, lower SES may be 
detrimental for one’s health because of social comparison. Individuals who are lower in 
SES may compare themselves to the rest of society and such a comparison could lead to 
chronic stress (independent of any environmental stressors) and eventually illness. The 
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implication is that relative standing may be consequential above and beyond one’s 
absolute SES standing. 
The possibility that it is one’s relative SES that influences health led researchers 
to shift their attention towards subjective social status. Subjective social status is an 
individual’s perception of his or her ranking in society in terms of education, occupation, 
and income. Note that SES and subjective status are related but distinct, and as a 
consequence each may have unique influence on the individual. For example, consider 
two office clerks who have the same schooling and earn the same salary. Yet individual 
A appraises his or her SES as being relatively worse off than individual B. It can be 
hypothesized that individual A is at greater risk for illness, even though both individuals 
have access to the same material resources. In order to address this hypothesis, a measure 
of subjective social status was developed. The MacArthur Scale of Subjective Social 
Status (SSS; Adler et al., 2000) is a measure for which participants indicate on a visual 
representation of a ladder on which rung they see themselves relative to others in terms of 
their SES. The hypothesis underlying the development of the SSS was that perceptions of 
being worse off may result in greater psychological stress for individuals, and that such 
psychological stress would negatively impact their health.  
The SSS is a single-item measure in the form of a line drawing of a ladder. The 
ladder has ten rungs and participants are asked to consider this ladder as representing 
where individuals stand in society. Similar ladder measures have been used previously to 
assess self-perceptions of success in major life domains (Cantril, 1965) as well as the 
status of one’s social group (Abeles, 1976). The SSS is unique in that it measures 
people’s sense of their social standing exclusively in terms of their individual SES. 
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Instructions for the measure indicate that those individuals at the top of the ladder are 
those with the best education, occupation, and income, whereas those individuals at the 
bottom are the worst off with respect to education, occupation, and income. Individuals 
respond to the ladder by placing an X on the rung that best represents their own position 
in society.  
 The measure was initially developed with a sample of 157 healthy white women 
(Adler et al., 2000). These women completed the subjective status scale, and reported on 
their SES and on a variety of health and psychosocial measures. Participants also 
completed the negative affect subscale of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule 
(PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), which was included as a control variable in 
the analyses. The sample was relatively well off, with a majority of participants having at 
least a college degree. On average, most participants saw themselves as having above 
average status. A series of hierarchical regressions was conducted to determine if 
subjective status predicted health outcomes above and beyond negative mood and SES. 
In Adler and colleagues’ sample, SES was largely unrelated to most health outcomes, but 
was still entered first into the regression with negative affect entered second and 
subjective status entered third. Even after controlling for SES and negative affect, lower 
subjective status was associated with a variety of negative outcomes such as greater sleep 
latency, higher resting heart rate, greater chronic stress, greater pessimism, poorer control 
over life, less active coping, and more passive coping.  
The authors theorized as to how negative affect may relate to subjective status. 
They argued that subjective status may not only increase negative affect, but may in turn 
be influenced by negative mood. However, they concluded that, given the many 
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outcomes that are still linked to subjective status even after controlling for negative 
affect, subjective status has many of its effects independent of any shared variance with 
negative mood. 
In a follow-up study (Singh-Manoux et al., 2003), an attempt was made to 
replicate earlier findings with a larger more representative sample, and to establish the 
principal determinants of subjective social status. The sample consisted of approximately 
7 000 office workers from English civil service departments. Participants responded to 
the subjective status scale, as well as reporting on several indicators of SES. Health 
outcomes for the study were the presence of diagnoses for several illnesses, including 
angina, diabetes, respiratory illness, depression, as well as a global measure of perceived 
health. Participants also responded to a life satisfaction questionnaire as well as measures 
of feelings of financial security, satisfaction with one’s standard of living, and sense of 
material deprivation. Several psychosocial indicators were included as well, such as 
hopelessness, control at work, general life control, mental health, vigilance, hostility, and 
optimism. 
A series of logistic regressions was conducted separately for men and women. 
The results were that lower subjective status was generally linked to worse health 
outcomes for both genders. The links between subjective status and illness were 
somewhat attenuated after controlling for SES, but lower subjective status was linked to 
more illness nonetheless. In order to address the question of determinants of subjective 
status, 16 measures of both objective SES and psychosocial functioning were included in 
a series of multiple regressions predicting subjective status. Only 5 variables were 
retained on account of their significant contribution to the model. These variables in order 
9 
of strongest to weakest were: employment grade, satisfaction with standard of living, 
household income, feeling of financial security, and education. Note that three of five 
identified determinants are also basic indicators of SES (i.e., education, occupation, and 
income). The authors concluded that SES was primary in determining subjective status, 
and that subjective status is derived from a relatively unbiased cognitive averaging of 
indicators of one’s SES.  
Further research on the psychometric properties of the SSS demonstrated 
relatively strong test-retest reliability (Operario, Adler, & Williams, 2004). The same 
study replicated the finding that lower subjective status predicts poor health above and 
beyond the contribution of SES. In addition, they found that controlling for negative 
affect diminished the link between subjective status and health. This is consistent with an 
interpretation that negative affect partially mediates the link between subjective status 
and health.  
Since the initial development of the SSS, some research purports to demonstrate 
that individuals with lower subjective status experience changes in their physiology and 
neuroanatomy. Such physiological changes might further explain some of the poorer 
health and health behaviors observed amongst lower subjective status individuals. One 
study demonstrated that lower subjective status was linked to greater cortisol at waking 
after controlling for SES and health factors (Wright & Steptoe, 2005). In addition, lower 
subjective status has also been associated with less grey matter volume in certain brain 
regions associated with emotional regulation, after controlling for negative affect 
(Gianaros et al., 2007). Given these studies, one can argue that if lower subjective status 
individuals experience chronically higher levels of stress hormones and neurological 
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deficits, then it would be of no surprise that lower subjective status individuals are at 
higher risk for negative health outcomes. 
Further research has attempted to extend the findings relating subjective status to 
health with samples from across the lifespan. For example, adolescents’ perceived SES in 
society was inversely related to health (Page et al., 2009). For older adults, lower 
subjective status appears to be a robust predictor of a variety of health problems 
(Demakakos, Nazroo, Breeze, & Marmot, 2008), though perhaps these effects are 
particularly stronger for women (Hyde & Jones, 2007). The influence for older adults of 
subjective status on poor health has been observed cross-culturally, as it has been 
observed in a sample of older Taiwanese individuals (Hu, Adler, Goldman, Weinstein, & 
Seeman, 2005).  
 Subjective status not only influences health outcomes but may be related to a 
range of health behaviors. For a sample of older adults, lower subjective status was a 
stronger predictor of greater smoking and drinking than was lower education (Shankar, 
McMunn, & Steptoe, 2010). Two studies have specifically examined how subjective 
status relates to smoking. For women who had quit smoking because of pregnancy, lower 
subjective status was associated with greater relapse (Reitzel et al., 2007). In another 
study, lower subjective status was related to relapse in smoking for individuals trying to 
quit and this effect of lower subjective status on relapse was partially mediated by 
negative mood (Reitzel, Mazas, Cofta-Woerpel, Li, et al., 2010). 
Not only is an individual’s health associated with his or her subjective status, but 
one’s health may even be influenced by the subjective status of others. In a large 
epidemiological study conducted in Hungary (Kopp, Skrabski, Kawach, & Adler, 2005; 
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Kopp, Skrabski, Réthelyi, Kawachi, & Adler, 2004), the average level of subjective status 
in a region was associated with the health of individuals in that region. In particular, 
those men who live in areas where women generally have lower subjective status went on 
to have worse health.  
Subjective status has also been linked to a variety of outcomes beyond traditional 
health measures. For example, higher subjective status is linked to less burn-out for long-
term care providers (Ayalon, 2008), better body image (Leedy, 2007), better adjustment 
amongst the homeless (Cox, 2005), better responses to a psychotherapy intervention 
amongst HIV patients (Peake, 2006), and greater perceived control (Kraus, Piff, & 
Keltner, 2009). These findings point to the great variety of outcomes that researchers 
have linked to subjective status. 
Subjective status was initially validated in a sample of white American women 
(Adler et al., 2000), and so the question can be raised whether subjective status plays an 
important role in other social groups. Amongst Taiwanese individuals, there was 
consistency with previous research in how SES was linked to subjective status (Goldman, 
Cornman, & Chang, 2006). Other research has linked subjective status to important 
outcomes with samples from Macau (Leung, 2009), and Japan (Sakurai, Kawakami, 
Yamaoka, Ishikawa, & Hashimoto, 2010). For pregnant women from different ethnic 
groups in the United States, lower subjective status was related to worse self-reported 
health (Stewart, Dean, Gregorich, Brawarsky, & Haas, 2007). In a sample of various 
ethnic groups in the United States, subjective status was linked to health in roughly 
similar ways, though some minor differences were found in how strongly various facets 
of SES were linked to subjective status (Yip, 2003).  
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In contrast to the findings reviewed above, other research supports a moderating 
role for ethnicity on subjective status. For example, SES and subjective status showed 
different strengths of association across different ethnic communities in the United States 
(Adler et al., 2008; Wolff, Acevedo-Garcia, Subramanian, Weber, & Kawachi, 2010). 
One explanation for this variability is that for visible minorities, there may be greater 
complexity in how one’s rank is assessed. Among youths from First Nations, those who 
have greater social and emotional resources report higher subjective status (Brown et al., 
2008). For low-income Mexican-Americans, lower subjective status was related to worse 
mental and subjective health, but this relation appeared to be mediated by perceptions of 
victimization (Franzini & Fernandez-Esquer, 2006). Other work has shown the limits of 
subjective status with this sample of Mexican-Americans, as subjective status was 
unrelated to a measure of obesity (Fernald, 2007). With Asian-Americans, lower 
subjective status was also unrelated to body mass index and smoking after controlling for 
SES, although it did predict worse subjective health (Castro, Gee, & Takeuchi, 2010). 
Further work on subjective status among visible minorities has examined 
subjective status in the context of immigration. In a sample of Hispanic-American 
immigrants, acculturation plays a role in shaping subjective status above and beyond SES 
(Reitzel, Mazas, Cofta-Woerpel, Vidrine, et al., 2010). Those immigrants who could only 
speak Spanish had lower subjective status independent of their socioeconomic 
circumstances. For Asian-American immigrants, the reasons for immigrating and the age 
of immigration may play a role in how subjective status operates in these individuals’ 
lives (Chen, Gee, Spencer, Danziger, & Takeuchi, 2009; Leu et al., 2008).  
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Finally, some work has examined how subjective status ranking in terms of 
society at large may differ from ranking status in one’s immediate community. One study 
found that relative to other possible referent groups, ranking oneself relative to society at 
large – which is the usual subjective status measure – was the most important predictor of 
health (Wolff, Subramanian, Acevedo-Garcia, Weber, & Kawachi, 2010). However, 
other work with cardiovascular health has shown subjective status relative to society at 
large correlates with some health outcomes, whereas subjective status vis-à-vis one’s 
community relates to other health outcomes (Ghaed & Gallo, 2007).  
The relative contributions of SES and subjective status to health have been a 
source of some controversy. Initial work demonstrated that subjective status was a better 
predictor of health than was a facet of SES, which was occupational level (Singh-
Manoux, Marmot, & Adler, 2005). However, in a study of employed Scottish men from 
diverse work settings, subjective status was argued to be a relatively less important 
predictor of health than more objective measures of status (Macleod, Smith, Metcalfe, & 
Hart, 2005). In the latter study, a different approach was taken to measure subjective 
social status. Individuals were asked to identify their rank in their workplace as either an 
employee, foreman, or manager. In the sample, managers had higher objective status 
(e.g., lived in better neighbourhoods and had obtained more education) than employees 
and foremen, whereas foremen’s higher status relative to employees was largely only in 
terms of their job title. As such, one’s perception of oneself as a foreman came with little 
material advantage when compared to the employees, and yet foremen had a higher sense 
of rank within their organization. This sense of higher rank conferred only a weak 
advantage to health, whereas more objective measures of status such as parental SES and 
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access to a car were both more closely linked to health. The authors concluded that seeing 
oneself as being higher in social rank is simply less important than one’s material 
circumstances. 
Given this critique on subjective status, Adler (2006), one of the originators of the 
SSS, issued a response shortly after. She offered several criticisms of the preceding study. 
In one criticism, she noted that the purported measure of subjective status was perhaps no 
different than a measure of occupational status, which is an indicator of SES. Another 
criticism was that the work settings from which the participants were recruited were quite 
heterogeneous, ranging from chemical factories to banks. The meaning of job rank could 
be different across settings, making the results difficult to interpret. In sum, the research 
by Macleod and colleagues (2005) may have less contrasted subjective status with SES 
than pitted different facets of SES against each other. 
Macleod, Smith, Metcalfe, and Hart (2006) responded to Adler’s critiques. They 
argued that their use of job rank as a marker of subjective status was based on prior 
research, and they presented data to show consistency across the worksites. Finally, they 
noted that research on subjective status has political ramifications which make this 
domain of research vulnerable to bias. For example, individuals who are generally hostile 
to wealth redistribution may read into the general body of subjective status research 
support for their political position. After all, if it is less important for public health to 
improve working class individuals’ actual material conditions than it is to simply improve 
their perception of those conditions, then many social service programs may be up for 
questioning. Returning to empirical considerations, Macleod and colleagues also pointed 
out that causal direction in this area of research is going unquestioned. In particular, they 
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noted how psychosocial variables such as self-esteem – which are often construed as 
being causal of health outcomes – could just as easily be outcomes of health changes. 
Such arguments can be extended to subjective status itself. 
The assumption has been since the work of Singh-Manoux and colleagues (2003) 
that subjective status is essentially an unbiased averaging of one’s SES. However, there 
may be good reason to hypothesize the role of other constructs in shaping subjective 
social status. First, as mentioned above, psychosocial factors have been identified as 
important in shaping subjective status at least in certain visible minority groups  (Brown 
et al., 2008; Franzini & Fernandez-Esquer, 2006). Second, in line with the arguments of 
Macleod and colleagues (2006), cross-sectional research (which is the methodology 
adopted in most of the reviewed studies on subjective status) is poorly equipped to 
establish directionality between related constructs. As a consequence, many of 
documented psychosocial outcomes of subjective status could in actuality be 
determinants of subjective status. 
One study investigated how subjective status may be related to a variety of 
psychosocial factors, in order to better understand whether subjective status may be 
influenced by such constructs. Lundberg and Kristensen (2008) examined how subjective 
status was related to a comprehensive list of psychosocial factors including cynicism, 
depression, hopelessness, life satisfaction, mastery, optimism, perceived control, self-
esteem, sense of coherence, shame, and vital exhaustion. The authors found that, in 
general, psychosocial factors were more closely linked to subjective status than to SES. 
In addition, they found that subjective status was still linked to health after controlling for 
most of the psychosocial factors. However, including life satisfaction resulted in a 
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nonsignificant association between subjective status and health. The authors were 
generally hesitant to draw strong conclusions from this finding as life satisfaction itself is 
a multidetermined construct that may be measuring elements of the individuals’ objective 
circumstances as well as their subjective state. Finally, the authors found that in a cross-
sectional analysis, the strongest psychosocial predictors of subjective status were life 
satisfaction, self-esteem, trust, and perceived control. Overall, the authors argued that 
some of the psychosocial variables may very well act as determinants of subjective status, 
although longitudinal and experimental research is needed to establish this point.  
The Present Research 
The focus in the present studies was on how personality and previous illness may 
influence individuals’ subjective status above and beyond the contribution of SES. In 
contrast to the account provided by Singh-Manoux and colleagues (2003), it will be 
argued in the present studies that individuals derive their subjective status through a 
variety of means beyond a simple cognitive averaging of indicators of their social class. 
Instead, it is hypothesized that subjective status judgments will be influenced by the 
individual’s level of neuroticism, extraversion, perceived control, and recent illness. 
Several mechanisms for how these factors may influence subjective status will be 
proposed.  
In the present research, neuroticism, extraversion, and perceived control will be 
considered as possible predictors of subjective status. Neuroticism is a core feature of 
personality which is defined by the tendency to experience negative moods and emotions 
(Watson, 2000; Watson & Clark, 1992; Widiger, 2009). Neuroticism has a strong genetic 
basis (Jang, Livesley, & Vernon, 1996), and is generally stable across the life span, 
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though individuals on average become slightly less neurotic with age (Roberts, Walton, 
& Viechtbauer, 2006). The poorer psychological outcomes associated with neuroticism 
include lower self-esteem and lower perceived control (Hankin, Lakdawalla, Carter, 
Abela, & Adams, 2007; Judge, Erez, Bono, & Thoresen, 2002; Watson, Suls, & Haig, 
2002). Furthermore, neurotic individuals experience more frequent intrusive thoughts 
(Flehmig, Steinborn, Langner, & Westhoff, 2007). Given the association of neuroticism 
with negative psychological outcomes, it is not surprising that individuals who are more 
neurotic are at greater risk of developing a mental disorder (Beard, Heathcote, Brooks, 
Earnest, & Kelly, 2007; Kendler, Gatz, Gardner, & Pederse, 2006).  
Beyond psychological outcomes, neuroticism is associated with a variety of 
health-related outcomes. For example, individuals higher in neuroticism evidence worse 
self-reported health (Jorm, Christensen, Henderson, & Korten, 1993) and poorer health 
behaviors (Williams, O'Brien, & Colder, 2004). One mechanism by which neuroticism 
may have its influence on health is through physiological overactivation of the stress 
response. Indeed, neurotic individuals have chronically higher levels of cortisol, a major 
stress hormone (Nater, Hoppmann, & Klumb, 2010). The consequences of neuroticism 
extend beyond individuals’ health, as economic analyses place the annual health-related 
costs of high neuroticism to society in the billions (Cuijpers et al., 2010). Neuroticism has 
also been directly linked to status-related outcomes. For example, more neurotic 
individuals see themselves as more submissive (Gilbert & Allan, 1994), and are seen by 
peers as having lower status in their immediate peer groups (Anderson, John, Keltner, & 
Kring, 2001), though the latter finding held only for men. In addition, more neurotic 
individuals experience worse life outcomes, such as poorer educational and occupational 
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attainment, higher risk of divorce, and earlier mortality (Roberts, Kuncel, Shiner, Caspi, 
& Goldberg, 2007). Given the wide ranging effects of neuroticism, it is plausible to argue 
that the psychosocial consequences of subjective status that have been identified in prior 
research are in fact due to individual differences in neuroticism that were not taken into 
account or controlled for. Given the wide ranging effects of neuroticism, it is not 
sufficient to measure and control for acute negative affect in research on subjective social 
status.  
In Chapter 2, neuroticism is examined as a possible determinant of subjective 
status. It was hypothesized that individuals with higher neuroticism attain lower 
socioeconomic status (as measured by education, occupational prestige, and salary), 
report more severe illnesses, and have greater acute negative affect, all of which are 
associated with lower subjective status. In addition, it was hypothesized that there will be 
a direct link between higher neuroticism and lower subjective status. These hypotheses 
were considered in a sample of recent retirees who were followed over a two-year period. 
In Chapter 3, neuroticism is treated as a control variable for analyses examining the 
association between objective health and subjective status. In both studies of Chapter 4, 
neuroticism is considered as a common determinant for both subjective status and 
perceived control, and it was expected that neuroticism partially explains the observed 
association between the latter two constructs. 
Extraversion is characterized by a tendency to experience positive affect, as well 
as a tendency to be more sociable and dominant (Costa & McCrae, 1992; Gilbert & 
Allan, 1994; Lucas, Le, & Dyrenforth, 2008; Watson & Clark, 1992). Extraversion, like 
neuroticism, is a highly heritable (Jang et al., 1996) and stable (Roberts et al., 2006) core 
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dimension of personality. Environmental factors may also influence extraversion. First, 
birth order may play a role at least in shaping the dominance aspect of extraversion. One 
study found that later born individuals were generally more dominant (and by implication 
more extraverted) than their older siblings (Pollet, Dijkstra, Barelds, & Buunk, 2010). In 
addition to birth order, it has been argued that individuals who possess socially valued 
traits such as physical strength and attractiveness will go on to develop greater 
extraversion (Lukaszewski & Roney, 2011). Converging evidence for this argument can 
be found with one study that showed that photos of more extraverted individuals were 
rated as more physically attractive by unacquainted judges (Meier, Robinson, Carter, & 
Hinsz, 2010). In sum, individuals may develop higher extraversion due to a variety of 
factors including genetics, birth order, and physical traits. 
 Individuals higher in extraversion experience a variety of positive outcomes. 
More extraverted individuals have higher self-efficacy (Lent et al., 2005), higher self-
esteem (Watson et al., 2002), and greater subjective well-being (Weiss, Bates, & 
Luciano, 2008). Finally, more extraverted individuals report better health behaviors as 
well as more positive health-related cognitions (Williams et al., 2004). As with 
neuroticism, extraversion is related to individual differences in face to face status. For 
example, more extraverted individuals are seen as having higher status by their peers in 
their immediate social environment (Anderson et al., 2001).  Given the wide ranging 
impact of extraversion, it seems likely that individual differences in extraversion may 
account for what have been identified as psychosocial consequences of subjective status. 
 Extraversion was considered in all four studies of the present research. In 
ancillary analyses in Chapter 2, it was expected that extraversion is a positive predictor of 
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subjective status. This same expectation was formulated for young adults in Study 1 of 
Chapter 4. In addition, extraversion was treated as a control variable in Chapter 3 and in 
Study 2 of Chapter 4.  
Perceived control is a core dimension of personality that is conceptualized to be 
tightly negatively linked to neuroticism (Judge et al., 2002). Perceived control is often 
argued to be an important mediator in status and health research. Supportive of this 
argument are the findings that individuals with higher SES have higher perceived control, 
which in turn is associated with better health (Lachman & Weaver, 1998; Moore et al., 
2010). In addition to acting as a mediator, perceived control may moderate the 
relationship between SES and health, as the negative effects of low income on health are 
muted for individuals with higher perceived control (Lachman & Weaver, 1998). One 
explanation for why perceived control may promote better health may be that higher 
perceived control individuals have less physiological activation when stressed (Abelson, 
Khan, Liberzon, Erickson, & Young, 2008). In addition to perceived control leading to 
better health, some longitudinal research supports a bi-directional model in which better 
health leads individuals to experience themselves as having more control (Gerstorf, 
Röcke, & Lachman, 2011). The link between perceived control and health is relatively 
robust, but some evidence suggests the association between perceived control and health 
is more likely to be observed with older adults than with younger adults (Infurna, 
Gerstorf, & Zarit, 2011). In addition to the contribution perceived control may make on 
health, individuals with higher perceived control also experience a variety of positive 
psychological outcomes. For example, individuals higher in perceived control show 
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greater optimism (Klein & Helweg-Larsen, 2002), less depression, and higher life 
satisfaction (Lachman & Weaver, 1998).  
There is a positive association between perceived control and subjective status 
(e.g., Lundberg & Kristenson, 2008; Singh-Manoux et al., 2003). A more recent study 
has shown that individuals with lower subjective status tend to appraise life events as 
being due to environmental forces, and this relation was explained by the lower perceived 
control associated with lower subjective status (Kraus et al., 2009). Implicit in this 
conceptualization is the argument that lower subjective status is a determinant of 
perceived control. However, the research by Kraus and colleagues was mostly cross-
sectional, as is other research on subjective status and perceived control.  
 Neuroticism and extraversion may act as common determinants for both 
subjective status and perceived control. As such, it is unclear how strong the relation may 
be between the latter constructs, given that prior research did not control for personality. 
In the present research, the focus was on better understanding the strength of association 
between perceived control and subjective status as well as the direction of influence 
between the two. In Study 1 of Chapter 4, it was hypothesized that perceived control is 
only weakly related to subjective status in a model that includes neuroticism and 
extraversion, as well as SES. In Study 2 of Chapter 4, it was hypothesized that whatever 
modest relation remains between perceived control and subjective status is best 
understood as higher perceived control leading to higher subjective status. In addition, it 
was argued that satisfaction with one’s finances mediates this relation. 
 In addition to the effects of neuroticism, extraversion, and perceived control on 
subjective status, one also can expect that illness may play a role in influencing 
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subjective status. The position that one’s health may influence one’s subjective status is 
converse to the nearly unanimously held view that subjective status is a risk factor for 
future illness. The latter view is evident in the research literature reviewed above. Yet 
chronic illness is often associated with a drop in SES (Stenbeck & Hjern, 2007), and such 
a decrease would likely lead to lower subjective status. In addition, greater illness could 
result in lower perceived control, which as hypothesized above could result in a drop in 
subjective status. That illness might lead to less control has some support in research 
conducted with patients undergoing prolonged hospitalization (Halfens, 1995). Finally, 
people who are ill may act in a more submissive manner, which in turn may influence 
how they appraise their subjective status. Consider that individuals who are chronically 
ill may experience a variety of social and personal losses (Kelley, 1998), which may be 
reflected in a sense of lowered social worth. Further support for the more passive 
interpersonal style of recently ill individuals can be drawn from Schaller’s (2006) 
evolutionary theory of the behavioural immune system, in which individuals who 
perceive the threat of illness are particularly likely to act in a more introverted manner.  
 Illness is addressed in both Chapters 2 and 3. In Chapter 2, severity of reported 
illnesses was measured and it was hypothesized that more neurotic individuals report 
more severe illness, which in turn is associated with lower subjective status. In addition, 
the study also allowed for a test of the view that subjective status is a risk factor for 
illness. According to this view, individuals who have lower subjective status can be 
expected to go on to report worse illnesses in the following year. In Chapter 3, a more 
objective measure of health was used, namely the number of medical interventions each 
participant received in a public health-care system. It was hypothesized that individuals 
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who received more medical interventions in one year would go on to report lower 
subjective status in the subsequent year.  
 The present research consists of four studies which are focused on examining 
whether personality traits such as neuroticism, extraversion, and perceived control as well 
as recent health may be understood as determinants of subjective status. In Chapter 2, 
neuroticism was examined as a possible determinant of subjective status through a variety 
of pathways. In Chapter 3, the focus is on how individuals who have poorer health (as 
measured by number of medical interventions received in a year) may go on to report 
lower subjective status relative to their peers. Finally, Study 1 of Chapter 4 was a cross-
sectional study with young adults and examined the relative strength of association 
between different facets of personality (i.e., neuroticism, extraversion, and perceived 
control) and subjective status. Study 2 of Chapter 4 examined whether perceived control 
can be understood as a determinant of subjective status, as opposed to a consequence of 
subjective status. Across all studies, the overarching argument made is that subjective 
status is in fact influenced by personality and previous health and is not simply a bias free 








The Lower Subjective Social Status of Neurotic Individuals: Multiple Pathways through 
Occupational Prestige, Income, and Illness 
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Abstract 
Subjective social status seems to predict health outcomes, above and beyond the 
contribution of objective status. The present hypothesis was that neuroticism predicts 
subjective status, and does so via the influence of neuroticism on objective status (i.e., 
education, occupation, and income), self-perceived illness, and greater negative affect. In 
turn, lower subjective status would be associated with more severe self-perceived illness. 
Older adults (N = 341) shortly after retirement completed measures of neuroticism, and 
of attainment in education, occupation, and salary, and over 2 subsequent years 
completed measures of current subjective status, self-reported illness, and current 
negative affect. As hypothesized, greater neuroticism was associated with lower 
subjective status via lower objective status and more severe self-reported illness. 
However, current negative affect was not associated with subjective status and subjective 




 Neuroticism is a major dimension of personality, and has been shown to have a 
wide ranging set of influences on human experience and behaviour (Roberts et al., 2007). 
One of the consequences of neuroticism is that it may influence a person’s social 
standing. More neurotic individuals are lower on objective dimensions of social status, 
such as educational and occupational attainment (Roberts et al., 2007). Not only may 
neuroticism influence objective status, but neuroticism may also influence subjective 
status, which is a person’s own evaluation of their social standing. The present research 
was concerned with how neuroticism may influence subjective status, and how the 
documented influence of subjective status on health can be understood once the effects of 
neuroticism are taken into account in a more extensive manner than in prior research. 
Subjective status is linked to objective markers of status, but there is increasing evidence 
that subjective status influences health outcomes, above and beyond the contribution of 
objective status differences (Adler et al., 2000; Demakakos et al., 2008; Ghaed & Gallo, 
2007; Hu et al., 2005; Operario et al., 2004). 
Social status hierarchies are one of the basic forms of social relations (Fiske, 
1992), and are defined in terms of differences in status and power. It has been argued that 
there is an evolutionary basis for such hierarchies (Cummins, 2005; Mazur, 2005). People 
evaluate others’ status based on many cues, including their education, occupation, 
income, ethnicity, and language (Fişek, Berger, & Norman, 2005). Many of these factors 
are interrelated, and social scientists often use education, occupation, and income as key 
indicators of the broad objective status differences in society – these are differences in 
what is labeled socioeconomic status (SES; Rogers & Onge, 2007). Subjective social 
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status can be defined as a person’s felt sense of their own social rank in terms of 
education, occupation, and income. Subjective social status appears to reflect objective 
status differences. For a sample of 7,000 British civil servants (Singh-Manoux et al., 
2003), individuals with higher education, occupational rank, and income perceived 
themselves as having higher social status (beta weights were .13, .34, and .17, 
respectively). Subjective status is distinct from constructs such as perceived control, 
mastery, life satisfaction, and self esteem although the latter are positively related to 
subjective status (Kraus et al., 2009; Lundberg & Kristenson, 2008; Yip, 2003). 
Both objective and subjective status have important consequences for the 
individual. Differences in SES have wide ranging implications in people’s lives 
(American Psychological Association, 2006), not the least of which is the well 
established finding that lower SES predicts more negative health outcomes (World 
Health Organization, 2002). Above and beyond measures of SES, subjective status is a 
predictor of health outcomes (Adler et al., 2000; Demakakos et al., 2008; Ghaed & Gallo, 
2007; Hu et al., 2005; Operario et al., 2004). Findings indicate that those individuals who 
perceive themselves as having higher status tend to have better health, independent of 
their objective status. Note that differences have been observed between various ethnic 
groups in how subjective status predicts health outcomes. For instance, the relation 
between low subjective status and illness has been more consistently observed for 
European-Americans than for some visible minority groups (Adler et al., 2008; Ostrove, 
Adler, Kuppermann, & Washington, 2000).  
The present research is focused on how individual differences in neuroticism may 
predict subjective status. Prior research suggests a link, in that negative affect has been 
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shown to be negatively correlated with subjective status (Adler et al., 2000; Operario et 
al., 2004), and neuroticism is a strong predictor of negative affect (Watson & Clark, 
1992). Neuroticism is a core dimension of personality that encompasses the tendency to 
experience negative moods and emotions (Watson, 2000), and is associated with lower 
levels of well-being (Weiss et al., 2008). Neuroticism is highly heritable (e.g., Jang et al., 
1996; Weiss et al., 2008) and is generally stable — showing only a slight decline across 
the lifespan (Roberts et al., 2006). Neuroticism predicts many negative outcomes, 
including lower educational and occupational attainment, increased chance of divorce, 
and increased risk of mortality (Roberts et al., 2007). 
In the present study, we addressed the following 3 mechanisms by which 
neuroticism may predict subjective status: more neurotic individuals may experience 
lower subjective status via lower SES, increased self-perceived illness, and increased 
negative affect. First, individuals who are higher in neuroticism have lower occupational 
and educational attainment (Roberts et al., 2007), which are two components of SES. 
Given that people with lower SES have lower levels of subjective status (e.g., Adler et 
al., 2000; Singh-Manoux et al., 2003), it follows that more neurotic individuals will have 
lower subjective status. Second, more neurotic individuals may have lower subjective 
status because they may perceive themselves as more ill. Individuals who are more 
neurotic report poorer global health, as well as poorer health behavior self-efficacy 
(Williams et al., 2004). These types of findings may reflect bias, in that neuroticism was 
found in a sample of older adults to be more strongly related to subjective health than to 
objective health measures (Jorm et al., 1993). More neurotic individuals reported greater 
numbers of symptoms but did not differ from less neurotic individuals on physical 
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measures of health such as blood pressure. The negative bias of neurotic individuals may 
be due to their greater negative affect, which can foster a negative affect congruence bias 
when assessing one’s health and health behaviors. Indeed, individuals who are currently 
in a more negative mood show negativity biases for a wide range of judgments (Mayer, 
Gaschke, Braverman, & Evans, 1992). The potential for negative psychological bias on 
the part of more neurotic individuals points to the importance of distinguishing between 
subjective and objective aspects of health status. The present research is focused on 
subjective, self-perceived illness, given that self-perceptions may have ramifications on 
neurotic individuals’ subjective status. 
If neurotic individuals see themselves as more ill, they may in turn perceive 
themselves as lower in subjective status – for two reasons. The first concerns the 
perceived economic threat and actual economic consequences of illness. Many chronic 
illnesses lead to a drop in disposable income (Stenbeck & Hjern, 2007). As such, 
individuals who perceive themselves as more ill may perceive their economic position as 
more vulnerable, and may reassess their subjective status downward. A second means by 
which self-perceived illness may lead people to have lower subjective status is that they 
may feel less in control. As mentioned above, perceived control is positively related to 
subjective status (Lundberg & Kristenson, 2008), and it may be argued that diminished 
control may lead to a decrease in one’s subjective status. Illness does seem to lead to a 
diminished sense of control; for example, individuals who had to be hospitalized felt that 
their health was controlled by external forces (Halfens, 1995). In sum, self-perceived 
illness may diminish subjective status via perceived economic consequences and a 
perceived loss of control.  
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A third mechanism by which more neurotic individuals may see themselves as 
being of lower social rank is by increased negative affect. At any time, more neurotic 
individuals are more likely to be in a negative mood (Watson, 2000), and in turn these 
individuals may judge themselves as having lower status because such judgments are 
mood-congruent. This argument is supported by previous research that demonstrates a 
negative association between current negative affect and subjective status (Adler et al., 
2000; Operario et al., 2004). Note that in the latter studies, Adler, Operario and their 
respective colleagues both argued that increased negative affect is better understood as a 
consequence of low subjective status rather than as a determinant. However, these 
arguments were based on cross-sectional data, and it is difficult to conclude the direction 
of the relation between negative affect and subjective status using this research design 
(we return to these issues below). 
There are other possible mechanisms by which neuroticism may lead to lower 
subjective status, which will not be directly addressed in the present study. These include 
a generally negative sense of self, and a status-decreasing proximal social environment. 
First, neuroticism is linked to a generally negative outlook on the self (Hankin et al., 
2007; Watson et al., 2002), which may lead more neurotic individuals to report lower 
subjective status. In particular, the greater depression (Kendler et al., 2006), and lower 
self-esteem of more neurotic individuals may lead them to see themselves as having 
lower social rank. Second, individuals who are higher in neuroticism are likely to 
experience lower status in their proximal social environment, even with peers of equal 
educational and occupational attainment. Men and women higher in neuroticism seem to 
act as if they are of lower status, as they generally report engaging in more submissive 
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behavior (Gilbert & Allan, 1994). Furthermore, in one study of American college 
students, men who were higher in neuroticism were rated as having less status by their 
peers in their fraternity (Anderson et al., 2001) – note that this effect was not found for 
women in college sororities. Consequently, more neurotic individuals – or at least more 
neurotic men – may in turn perceive themselves as lower in status, given that self-
perceptions of status have been shown to correspond well to ratings provided by peers in 
groups created in laboratory studies (Anderson et al., 2006). In sum, if people use their 
status in their proximal social environment as an indicator of their status in society at 
large, it follows that more neurotic individuals will have lower subjective social status.  
  The present study examined the contributions neuroticism may have on subjective 
status in the context of a 2-year longitudinal study conducted with middle-aged and older 
adults. These individuals were followed during early retirement. At time 1, participants 
completed a measure of personality, and reported on their educational and occupational 
attainment and salary just before retirement. Over the next two years, they completed 
measures of current subjective social status, illness, and current affect once a year. We 
examined the determinants of subjective social status in early retirement, as it is an 
opportune setting to examine how neuroticism may influence self-perceived health and 
subjective status. Generally, health declines in older age and retirement is a time in which 
individuals are likely to be reevaluating their social rank. Furthermore, the use of a 
longitudinal design to examine how neuroticism may predict lower subjective status 
allows for better support of causal models than does a cross-sectional design (Bergman, 
Eklund, & Magnusson, 1994).  
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The main hypothesis in the current study was that more neurotic individuals have 
lower subjective status on account of lower SES, increased self-perceived illness, and 
increased negative affect. In particular, the SES hypothesis was that individuals higher in 
neuroticism have lower SES, which in turn leads to lower subjective status. SES was 
operationalized in terms of an individual’s educational and occupational attainment, as 
well as salary just prior to retirement. We expected that these indicators of SES would 
continue to influence individuals’ current subjective social status, even as they progressed 
through retirement. Indeed, prior occupation and achieved level of education would likely 
continue to influence the social status of retirees. For example, a retired judge likely has 
higher social status in others’ eyes than a retired bricklayer. As well, salary just before 
retirement was taken as an index of continuing financial status in retirement. It was 
expected that educational and occupational attainment as well as salary – the individual 
components of SES – will be related, in that more education will predict greater 
occupational attainment, which in turn will predict greater salary, as well as more 
education directly predicting greater salary. The illness hypothesis was that individuals 
higher in neuroticism perceive themselves as more ill, which leads to lower subjective 
status. The negative affect hypothesis was that more neurotic individuals have higher 
negative affect, which in turn leads to lower subjective status. In addition to these 3 
hypotheses, given that there are other plausible mechanisms unaccounted for in the 
present study by which neuroticism may influence subjective status, the additional effects 
hypothesis was that individuals who are higher in neuroticism have lower subjective 
status, even after taking into account SES, illness, and current negative affect. These 
additional effects, which are not being directly assessed in the present study, may be due 
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to neurotic individuals’ lower status in their proximal social environment and negative 
sense of self – these possibilities are described above.  
In addition to the set of hypotheses formulated in terms of neuroticism, the 
subjective status-illness hypothesis was that individuals who have lower subjective status 
will consequently perceive themselves as more ill in the future. As noted above, lower 
subjective status has been identified as a predictor of poorer health (Adler et al., 2000; 
Operario et al., 2004). Note that, when combined, the neuroticism hypothesis for illness 
and the subjective status-illness hypothesis suggest a recurring cycle of self-perceived 
illness and diminished subjective status: perceiving oneself as more ill leads to lower 
subjective status, and such a drop leads to actual health decline. In turn, such a health 
decline would be reflected in lower self-perceived health. Finally, SES is likely to 
influence self-perceived health. In addition to subjective status leading to greater self-
perceived illness, it can also be expected that lower objective status will do the same, 
given the evidence noted above linking lower SES to poorer health.  
There was an additional hypothesis with regard to the impact of subjective social 
status on negative affect. Given the longitudinal design of the present study, it will be 
possible to better identify how subjective status and negative affect are related. In line 
with the interpretation of the findings in previous cross-sectional research (Adler et al., 
2000; Operario et al., 2004), the subjective status-negative affect hypothesis was that 
lower subjective status leads individuals to concurrently experience more negative affect. 
Note this hypothesis of lower subjective status leading to more negative affect is distinct 
from the negative affect hypothesis stated above with regard to the impact of neuroticism, 
which is (in part) that increased negative affect leads to lower subjective status. At a 
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theoretical level, both of these hypotheses may be valid. In the present study, we 
considered both in the context of a longitudinal design.  
Method 
Participants 
 A sample of 433 participants was recruited via associations for retirees as well as 
via advertisements targeted at retirees in local newspapers (see Appendix A for the 
consent form used in the present study). The criteria for inclusion were that participants 
had worked full-time for at least 20 years and were currently working for no more than 
10 hours a week. In total, there were 341 participants (180 women and 161 men) who 
completed all two years of the study and did not have missing data (78.8% of the original 
sample). There were no significant differences between individuals who completed the 
study and those who did not, save that participants who completed the study had higher 
occupational prestige (M = 53.90, SD = .43) than non-completers (M = 50.82, SD = .99; 
t(431) = 3.16, p < .01). Mean age of participants who completed the study was 58.98 
years, with participant ages ranging from 44 to 77 years. The percentage of the sample 50 
years or younger was 1.5%, 51 to 55 years was 23.7%, 56 to 60 years was 41.4%, 60 to 
65 years was 23.1%, 65 to 70 years was 7.1%, and over 70 years was 3.2%. Ethnicity 
data was not collected, but it was apparent to us that participants were overwhelmingly of 
European ancestry.   
Materials 
The NEO Five Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI; Costa & McCrae, 1992). Neuroticism 
was assessed with the NEO-FFI, which is a 60-item questionnaire designed to measure 
major dimensions of personality. The other scales on the NEO-FFI measure 
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agreeableness, conscientiousness, extraversion, and openness to experience, which were 
not of primary concern in the present study. Each NEO-FFI item is a self-descriptive 
statement (e.g., “I am not a worrier”). For each item, participants circle the response that 
best matches their opinion on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to 
strongly agree (5).  
Overall, the NEO-FFI has satisfactory psychometric properties. All scales of the 
NEO-FFI have strong test-retest reliability across a 30 month period (Murray, Rawlings, 
Allen, & Trinder, 2003), and show convergent and divergent validity in a large sample 
(>35,000) of United States Air Force trainees (Zeiger, 1996). Furthermore, the NEO-FFI 
has been validated in a sample of Canadian female undergraduates, demonstrating 
adequate internal consistency (α = .73 to .87) for all 5 subscales (Holden & Fekken, 
1994).  
The MacArthur Scale of Subjective Social Status (SSS; Adler et al., 2000). The 
SSS is a single-item measure of a person’s current self-perceived social rank. The SSS 
consists of a set of instructions and a vertical line drawing of a ladder. There are 10 rungs 
on the ladder. Respondents are asked to think of the ladder as representing people’s 
present ranking in society in terms of their education, occupation, and income. Those at 
the top of the ladder are better off than those at the bottom of the ladder. Respondents are 
asked to place an X on the rung of the ladder that they think best represents their own 
current position. Responses higher on the ladder are assigned higher scores; scores 
ranged from 1 to 10. Given that the participants in the present study were retirees, the 
measure was modified to address the fact that these individuals were no longer employed 
(see Appendix B). As such, they were instructed to consider the job they held prior to 
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retirement to help assess their current status. This modification makes explicit what can 
be considered a common practice: the present self-perceived status of retirees is likely to 
be strongly influenced by their former occupations, and such perceptions would 
correspond to consensual views that others hold regarding how the status of retired 
individuals is defined. The psychometric properties of the SSS are relatively satisfactory 
(Operario et al., 2004). For example, participants’ scores on the SSS showed a test-retest 
correlation of .62 after 6 months. Furthermore, the SSS has also shown convergent 
validity, correlating with measures of SES (e.g., Adler et al., 2000).  
The Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson et al., 1988). Current 
negative affect was assessed with the PANAS, which is a 20-item measure of negative 
and positive affect. Negative affect is assessed in terms of negative items such as upset, 
and positive affect is assessed with items such as proud. Individuals indicate the degree 
to which they have experienced each state during the last 2 weeks. Responses are on 5-
point Likert scales with endpoints not at all (1) and extremely (5). The negative affect 
subscale was of primary concern in the present study. The PANAS has been found to 
have strong internal consistency for both the negative and positive scales (Crawford & 
Henry, 2004; Watson et al., 1988). Furthermore, the PANAS has good construct validity, 
as the PANAS subscales correlate appropriately with measures of adjustment (Crawford 
& Henry, 2004).  
Illness Checklist. Participants reported the total number of illnesses and symptoms 
they experienced in the previous year by selecting items from an illness checklist, which 
was a 106-item list of symptoms and illnesses (see Appendix C) that was based mostly on 
the list found in the Seriousness of Illness Rating Scale (SIRS; Wyler, Masuda, & 
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Holmes, 1968; Wyler, Masuda, & Holmes, 1970). In the present study, we focused on a 
severity score for reported illness, according to the scheme proposed by the scale 
originators. For example, a mild condition such as a headache is assigned a weight of 92, 
whereas a serious illness such as leukemia is assigned a weight of 1160. These weights 
were derived from physician ratings. The weighted score is the square root of the sum of 
the weighted items. The square root transformation normalizes the data, which is 
necessary given the large weights. Items on the checklist which were not found in the 
original SIRS and therefore could not be weighted were excluded. Furthermore, to avoid 
spurious correlations between neuroticism and illness severity, the 6 items on the SIRS 
checklist that could be construed as primarily psychological in nature (i.e., alcoholism, 
anxiety reaction, depression, drug addiction, manic depression, and nervous breakdown) 
were excluded. In total, 69 illnesses on the checklist were included in the derivation of 
the severity score for reported illness. 
Demographics Questionnaire. Participants completed a demographics 
questionnaire concerning their age, gender, family, as well as their educational and 
occupational attainment, and their income just prior to retirement (see Appendix D). The 
assumption was that people who earned more prior to retirement will have higher income 
in the years following retirement. Education was scored as total number of years of 
formal study. Occupation was assigned a score using the Standard International 
Occupational Prestige Scale (SIOPS; Ganzeboom & Treiman, 1996; Treiman, 1977). 
With the SIOPS, occupations are each assigned a numerical value that reflects the level 
of approval and respect given each occupation within society at large. Scores can range 
from 13 for a garbage collector to 78 for a university professor. In sum, participants’ pre-
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retirement salary, years of formal education, and occupational prestige for the jobs from 
which they retired were taken together as indicators of SES. 
Procedure 
 The present study was part of a larger longitudinal study on retirement conducted 
at Concordia University. Individuals who were interested in participating contacted the 
laboratory. There were no more than 6 participants completing materials at any one 
session. At the first session (Time 1), the experimenter distributed a packet of 
questionnaires, which included the demographics questions and the NEO-FFI. 
Participants were asked to return for two more sessions, which were scheduled one year 
(Time 2) and two years (Time 3) later. During both of these latter sessions, participants 
completed the illness checklist, the PANAS, and the SSS. Participants completed other 
measures at these sessions, but they are not relevant to the current study. Participants 
were paid $50 per session. 
Results 
 Means and standard deviations as well as all correlations between scales are 
shown in Table I. Participants reported an average salary at the time of their retirement of 
$62,169 CAD (range: $10,000 to $344,500). Note that the participants in the present 
sample were relatively well-off when compared to national averages for this age group 
(Statistics Canada, 2006). Participants also had an average of 15.0 years (range: 7 to 21 
years, SD = 2.41) of formal education and obtained an average SIOPS score of 53.90 (SD 
= 7.95). Participants’ neuroticism scores (M = 15.41, SD = 7.60) were somewhat lower 
than those found in previous research with middle-aged and older adults (Allemand, 
Zimprich, & Hertzog, 2007), with the present sample being approximately half a standard  
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Table I 



















Measure 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Neuroticism —     
2. Education 
 
   -.06 —    




 —   




     .41
***
 —  
5. T2 Subjective Status    -.27
***
     .23
***  
     .17
**
    .39
***
 — 
6. T3 Subjective Status    -.28
***
     .18
**
     .25
***
    .38
***
    .59
***
 
7. T2 Reported Illness    .16
**
    -.02    -.03    -.21
***
   -.22
***
 
8. T3 Reported Illness      .23
***
    -.05    -.03    -.20
***
    -.21
***
 
9. T2 Negative Affect     .39
***
    -.06    -.03    -.10    -.10 
10. T3 Negative Affect     .48
***
    -.09    -.10    -.14
*
    -.11
*
 
M 15.41 14.95 53.90 62,169   7.05 
SD   7.60   2.41   7.95 31,110   1.34 
α     .86   — — — — 
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Table I (continued) 
Descriptive statistics and correlations between all measures in the model 
 
Note. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. N = 341. Salary reported in Canadian dollars. For 
all measures, higher scores mean more of the construct.  
Measure 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Neuroticism      
2. Education 
 
     
3. Occupational Prestige      
4. Salary      
5. T2 Subjective Status      
6. T3 Subjective Status —     
7. T2 Reported Illness   -.25
***
 —    
8. T3 Reported Illness    -.27
***
     .67
***
 —   
9. T2 Negative Affect   -.11
*
     .20
**
     .22
***
 —  
10. T3 Negative Affect   -.17
**
     .12
*
     .14
*
   .57
***
 — 
M  7.10 24.10 25.17 1.58 1.61 
SD  1.36 15.07 16.06   .56   .55 
α — — —   .87   .86 
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deviation lower in neuroticism. However, the norms of Allemand and colleagues were 
taken from a study conducted with European older adults with generally lower SES and 
as such, any comparison with these norms needs to be made with caution.  
 As indicated in Table I, there were significant zero-order correlations between 
subjective status and most of its proposed correlates (neuroticism, objective SES, illness, 
and negative affect). These correlations were in line with expectations. Both neuroticism 
and severity of reported illness were negatively associated with subjective status, as was 
concurrent negative affect (but the latter was a weak correlation, only observed at Time 
3). The three measures of objective status (i.e., education, occupation, and salary) were 
positively correlated with subjective status, with salary having the largest correlations 
with subjective status at different time points. 
Comparisons of mean scores across Time 2 and Time 3 
 A series of paired t-tests was conducted to compare the time 2 (T2) and time 3 
(T3) measurements of subjective status, negative affect, and self-reported illness. Overall, 
participants’ scores on subjective status did not differ between T2 (M = 7.05, SD = 1.34) 
and T3 (M = 7.10, SD = 1.36; t < 1). Similarly, individuals’ reported negative affect did 
not differ between T2 (M = 1.58, SD = .56) and T3 (M = 1.61, SD = .55; t(340) = 1.22, 
ns). Finally, self-reported illness did not differ between T2 (M = 24.10, SD = 15.07) and 
T3 (M = 25.17, SD = 16.06; t(340) = 1.56, ns). 
 Neuroticism, Subjective Status and Illness 
 Structural equation modeling (SEM; Kline, 2005) was used to test the hypotheses 
of the present study as paths in a model. Preliminary analyses revealed that there was a 
high level of multivariate kurtosis in the data (Normalized Mardia’s coefficient was 
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8.96). An examination of the kurtosis of the individual variables revealed that salary, as 
well as negative affect and subjective status at both T2 and T3 demonstrated large 
kurtosis (> 1.5). To resolve the problem of multivariate kurtosis, the maximum likelihood 
robust estimator was used to evaluate the path coefficients and to test their standard 
errors. The following values were used to assess model fit: Sattora-Bentler chi square (S-
Bχ²), comparative fit index (CFI), root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), 
and its 90% confidence interval (CI). A good fitting model has a nonsignificant S-Bχ², a 
CFI close to 1, RMSEA less than or equal to .05, a CI that is within the 0 to .08 range, 
and residuals less than .10. 
 The models described below are able to differentiate between baseline scores and 
change scores for subjective status, negative affect, and self-reported illness. In the 
models below, T2 scores can be conceptualized as representing the initial level for the 
respective constructs. After taking into account the variance accounted for by T2 scores, 
the remaining variance in T3 subjective status, negative affect, and self-reported illness 
can be conceptualized as change in these scores over 1 year. In sum, paths in the models 
to T2 scores are to initial levels of the measures whereas paths to T3 scores are for 
change in these scores over 1 year. 
The SEM analysis indicated that the proposed model provided a poor fit to the 
data (S-Bχ² (20) = 72.59, p < .001, CFI = .94, RMSEA = .09, CI = .07 – .11). 
Furthermore, there were four residuals above .10: between neuroticism and T3 negative 
affect, neuroticism and T3 self-reported illness, occupational prestige and T3 subjective 
status, and pre-retirement salary and T3 subjective status. Furthermore, seven of the 
proposed paths were non-significant (i.e., neuroticism to education, occupational prestige 
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to T2 subjective status, occupational prestige to T2 self-reported illness, education to T2 
self-reported illness, T2 negative affect to T2 subjective status, T2 subjective status to T3 
self-reported illness, and T3 self-reported illness to T3 negative affect). To improve the 
proposed model, four pathways were added to resolve the residuals and the seven non-
significant pathways were deleted. The second model provided a good fit to the data (S-
Bχ² (23) = 15.79, p = .86, CFI = 1, RMSEA < .01, CI = .00 – .02). However, the path 
from T3 negative affect to T3 subjective status was non-significant and a final model was 
tested with this pathway deleted. The final model provided an excellent fit to the data (S-
Bχ² (24) = 18.60, p = .77, CFI = 1, RMSEA < .01, CI = .00 – .03). All residuals were 
below .10 and all the proposed paths in the model were significant. See Figure 1 for the 
model. The model’s goodness of fit remained unchanged even when controlling for the 
effects of age and gender.
1
 Furthermore, the paths in the model in Figure 1 remained 
essentially unchanged when we included extraversion and current positive affect in the
                                                 
1
 Age and gender were added to the model presented in Figure 1. Individual paths from 
both age and gender to each of the other variables were included. The resulting model 
provided an excellent fit to the data (S-Bχ² (25) = 19.40, p = .78, CFI = 1, RMSEA < .01, 
CI = .00 – .03), with no residuals above .10. Higher age was significantly associated with 
lower pre-retirement salaries, higher levels of education, and greater T2 and T3 reported 
illness. With regard to gender, women were significantly more likely to have higher 
levels of neuroticism and lower levels of pre-retirement salaries than men. Most 
importantly, including age and gender in the model left the beta weights of the paths in 
Figure 1 virtually unchanged. As such, the results concerning age and gender are not 
presented in more detail.  
44 
  
Figure 1. Final model of the multiple pathways that link neuroticism to subjective status. 
  *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
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The measures of SES, which included education, occupational prestige, and pre-
retirement salary, were related: individuals with more education attained greater levels of 
occupational prestige (β = .55, z = 12.51, p < .001), which in turn was associated with 
higher pre-retirement salaries (β = .29, z = 4.72, p < .001). As well, individuals with more 
education reported higher levels of pre-retirement salaries, above and beyond the 
contribution of occupational prestige (β = .16, z = 3.15, p < .001). In line with the SES 
hypothesis, individuals who were more neurotic held jobs lower in prestige (β = -.11, z = 
-2.29, p < .05) and earned lower salaries (β = -.22, z = -5.02, p < .001) prior to retirement. 
                                                 
2
 In an alternative approach, we included extraversion measured at T1 and current 
positive affect (an important correlate of extraversion, which was measured with the 
PANAS, as was current negative affect) measured at T2 and T3 in the structural equation 
model that served to test the hypotheses (the model is reported in its final form in Figure 
1). Higher extraversion was negatively correlated with neuroticism and education, and 
associated with higher positive affect at T2 and T3. With regard to subjective status, the 
only effects that emerged were that higher extraversion was associated with greater 
subjective status at T2, and greater positive affect at T2 was associated with higher 
subjective status at T3. Furthermore, the inclusion in the model of these measures and the 
paths just described led to only very slight changes relative to the results reported in 
Figure 1. As such, the results for extraversion and positive affect are not presented in 
more detail. Finally, note that the other facets of personality assessed with the NEO-FFI 
(i.e., agreeableness, conscientiousness, and openness to experience) were not 
significantly related to subjective status when neuroticism was taken into account. 
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In turn, individuals with lower pre-retirement salaries had lower levels of T2 subjective 
status (β = .28, z = 5.95, p < .001). Whereas neuroticism was not significantly associated 
with education, those individuals with higher levels of education did report greater T2 
subjective status (β = .12, z = 2.31, p < .05). In addition, lower salary was not only 
associated with lower T2 subjective status, but also with lower T3 subjective status (β = 
.11, z = 2.24, p < .05). Whereas occupational prestige was not linked to T2 subjective 
status, it was linked to T3 subjective status (β = .11, z = 2.30, p < .05). Overall, there was 
evidence that the effects of neuroticism on subjective status could be accounted for in 
part by objective indicators of SES, particularly salary at time of retirement, which 
predicted both initial subjective status and change in subjective status over 1 year. 
In line with the illness hypothesis, more neurotic individuals reported greater T2 
illness (β = .11 z = 2.12, p < .05), which in turn was associated with lower T2 subjective 
status (β = -.13, z = -2.55, p < .01). Similarly, individuals who were more neurotic also 
reported greater T3 illness (β = .13, z = 3.35, p < .001), which was linked to lower T3 
subjective status (β = -.14, z = -2.97, p < .01). In sum, higher neuroticism was associated 
with greater initial self-reported illness, which in turn was associated with lower initial 
subjective status. Furthermore, higher neuroticism was associated with increases in self-
reported illness one year later, and such increases were associated with concurrent 
decreases in subjective status. 
 The negative affect hypothesis was not supported: individuals higher in 
neuroticism had greater T2 negative affect (β = .37, z = 7.21, p < .001) and greater T3 
negative affect (β = .30, z = 5.59, p < .001), but T2 and T3 negative affect were not linked 
to lower T2 or T3 subjective status, respectively. Furthermore, these results are 
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inconsistent with the subjective status-negative affect hypothesis, which leads to the 
expectation of a path from subjective status to concurrent negative affect. In sum, 
whereas greater neuroticism was associated with more initial negative affect and 
increased negative affect one year later, there was no path in the model between negative 
affect and subjective status. 
The last of the four neuroticism hypotheses was the additional effects hypothesis, 
which was supported: individuals who were more neurotic had lower T2 subjective status 
(β = -.17, z = -3.28, p < .001), above and beyond the contributions of SES and reported 
illness to subjective status. As such, higher neuroticism was directly associated with 
greater initial subjective status whereas there was no direct relation of neuroticism to 
change in subjective status one year later.  
The present model was also consistent with previous research linking SES to 
negative health outcomes. Individuals with higher pre-retirement salaries reported less T2 
illness (β = -.18, z = -3.51, p < .001). However, education and occupational prestige were 
not associated with reported illness. Furthermore, the model failed to support the 
subjective status-illness hypothesis. There was no relation between individuals’ T2 
subjective status and their T3 reported illness. In other words, initial subjective status did 
not predict changes in reported illness. The other finding that emerged for self-reported 
illness is that individuals who reported more T2 illness experienced greater T2 negative 
affect (β = .14, z = 2.57, p < .01); no such relation was found at T3. This finding indicates 
that individuals with higher initial self-reported illness experienced more initial negative 
affect whereas change in both of these constructs over one year was unrelated. Finally, 
reflecting the relative stability of participants’ subjective experience and health, negative 
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affect (β = .46, z = 7.06, p < .001), severity of reported illness (β = .65, z = 14.67, p < 
.001), and subjective status (β = .50, z = 10.65, p < .001) remained relatively stable from 
T2 to T3.   
Discussion 
 In the present study, neuroticism was shown to have a negative influence on 
individuals’ subjective social status, and did so in different ways. A large group of 
retirees initially reported on their personality and their standing on demographic 
variables, and was followed over a period of 2 years, during which time they completed 
yearly self-report measures of illness, subjective status, and negative affect. The findings 
were that more neurotic individuals reported at the outset (Time 1) having retired from 
occupations that were of lower prestige and of lower salary. In turn, lower standing on 
SES indicators was associated with lower initial subjective status at Time 2 (1 year later), 
and lower occupational prestige and salary were also associated with decreased 
subjective status at Time 3 (2 years later). In addition, individuals who were more 
neurotic, as reported at the outset (Time 1) of the study, went on to report poorer initial 
health (Time 2) and decreased health one year later (Time 3). Poorer initial health was 
associated with lower initial subjective status (both at Time 2), and decreased health at 
Time 3 was associated with decreased subjective status at Time 3. Finally, more neurotic 
individuals had lower initial subjective status above and beyond the contributions of SES 
and self-perceived illness. The latter effect may – as argued above – be due to the lower 
status in the proximal social environment and the negative self-concept of more neurotic 
individuals. These two factors were not explicitly addressed in the present study.  
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 The present findings highlight the negative influence of neuroticism on human 
functioning. In the present study, a broad heritable trait such as neuroticism was 
associated with major life outcomes such as attainment in occupation and salary, which in 
turn were associated with lower subjective status in early retirement, as well as decreases 
in subjective status one year later. The model in Figure 1 suggests a life-long pattern for 
neurotic individuals of somewhat greater difficulties in achievement which leave these 
individuals by later life feeling somewhat diminished in their social rank relative to 
society at large. These effects of neuroticism may be apparent not only later in life, but 
earlier in adulthood as well. The present results suggest that it is important for researchers 
to take into account individual differences in neuroticism when attempting to define the 
causes and consequences of subjective social status.  
 Neuroticism was also linked to subjective status via self-reported illness. More 
neurotic individuals experienced poorer self-reported health initially and experienced 
decreased self-reported health one year later, which were associated with poorer initial 
subjective status and decreases in subjective status one year later, respectively. The 
greater self-perceived illness of neurotic individuals may be due to biases whereby more 
neurotic individuals perceive themselves as having worse illnesses. Perhaps the self-
perceived illness of neurotic individuals reflects differences in objective health due to the 
effects of chronic stress linked to neuroticism (see Watson, 2000 for a review of these 
arguments). The present study does not speak to which explanation is best. Regardless of 
the bases of self-perceived illness, initials levels of self-reported illness and subjective 
status were negatively related in the present study, with increased levels of self-reported 
illness over one year linked to decreases in subjective status in the same time span. These 
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results may be attributed to both a sense of loss of control and economic vulnerability 
which may be associated with self-perceptions of poorer health.  
Contrary to one of the hypotheses, neuroticism did not contribute to lowered 
subjective status via increased negative affect. That is, participants’ self-reports of 
subjective status were not influenced by current affect. Affective biases are more likely to 
occur during elaborative thinking (Forgas, 1995), in which negative affect might lead 
individuals to make more negative judgments. Perhaps judgments of one’s status are 
made relatively quickly, rendering such judgments immune from the influence of current 
affect. Contrary to another of the hypotheses, lower subjective status did not lead to more 
negative affect. In the model seen in Figure 1, there is no direct relation between 
subjective status and negative affect at either time 2 or time 3. What all these findings 
point to is that more neurotic individuals have lower subjective status and greater 
negative affect, but subjective status and negative affect are not directly related. The 
implication is that previous research on subjective status that has controlled for the 
impact of current negative affect (Adler et al., 2000; Operario et al., 2004) has not 
adequately controlled for the effects of neuroticism.  
Contrary to the subjective status-illness hypothesis, individuals lower in initial 
subjective status did not report increases in illness severity scores one year later. One way 
to understand the discrepancy between the findings for the illness severity measure and 
previous research linking subjective status to poorer health is that subjective status does 
influence health, but does so by increasing the frequency of only minor ailments (e.g., 
headaches). An effect on minor ailments would be plausible, as low SES has been shown 
to predict such conditions (Huurre, Rahkonen, Komulainen, & Aro, 2005). However, the 
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significance of minor ailments is downplayed with the use of a weighted illness severity 
measure of the type used in the present study, which may explain why severity of 
reported illness was not predicted by subjective status.  
The present findings have implications for research on subjective status and 
health. One key finding in the present study is that self-perceived illness for the preceding 
year was linked to current subjective status. Given this link, it becomes necessary to take 
into account prior illness history when examining how subjective status may predict 
subsequent illness. Previous research supporting a link between low subjective status and 
poor health was done without controlling for prior health problems (Adler et al., 2000; 
Adler et al., 2008; Demakakos et al., 2008; Ghaed & Gallo, 2007; Hu et al., 2005; Hyde 
& Jones, 2007; Page et al., 2009; Singh-Manoux et al., 2005; Yip, 2003), with the only 
exception being one study that controlled for cardiovascular risk factors (Operario et al., 
2004).  
 There are four principal limitations in the present study. The first limitation is that 
the sample of retirees who participated was above average in SES, and it can be argued 
that a wealthier sample may not be representative. This argument highlights the 
magnitude of influence of neuroticism in the present study. Higher SES individuals show 
a greater relative contribution of heritable factors – such as neuroticism – to their overall 
life satisfaction (W. Johnson & Krueger, 2006), and the relations between neuroticism 
and a variety of outcomes related to well-being (i.e., health, and affect) may have been 
particularly evident with the wealthier sample of the present study. This is advantageous 
and perhaps even necessary in a short term longitudinal study of the type reported here. A 
second limitation of the present study was that the demonstrated relations between 
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neuroticism, status, and reported health were found in an older sample and that 
conclusions drawn from this research may not extend to younger populations. However, 
neuroticism is a relatively stable trait (Roberts et al., 2006), and its negative influence is 
likely to occur across the entire lifespan. Third, the use of a longitudinal design prevents 
us from drawing causal conclusions concerning the role of neuroticism in influencing 
subjective status. We can claim that these findings are consistent with a causal model, but 
the design does not preclude the possibility of hidden variables driving observed 
associations between the predictor and outcome variables. Fourth, the illness measure 
was based on self-report. Even though self-perceived health was influenced by 
neuroticism and in turn affected subjective social status, it would be advantageous to also 
have measures of objective health. The latter measures would, in particular, make clearer 
the impact of subjective status on health. 
Neuroticism is a heritable and relatively stable dimension of personality which 
influences lower subjective status through a variety of mechanisms. That neuroticism 
may influence subjective status through both social and self-perceived health outcomes 
speaks to the pervasive negative influence of neuroticism as a core dimension of 
personality. The present study demonstrates how the negative consequences of 
neuroticism unfold across time in a series of cascades. Individuals who are more neurotic 
go on to earn less money in occupations of lower prestige, to report poorer health, and 
ultimately, to feel lower in social rank. Neuroticism is associated with a series of negative 
outcomes, all of which feed into individuals’ perceptions of their lower social status. 
What remains unclear is the psychological significance for more neurotic individuals of 
having lower subjective status. Indeed, the present study did not find a link between 
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subjective status and negative affect, or between subjective status and subsequent self-
perceived health. One should not assume that all individuals seek and are more satisfied 
with higher status (Josephs, Sellers, Newman, & Mehta, 2006). Future research could be 
directed at better delineating the consequences of lower subjective status. The focus in 
the present study was on retired, older adults, and one possibility to be explored in future 
research is that younger adults may make life choices, in terms of occupation and career, 













Objective: To test the hypothesis that worse health leads to a decline in subjective status. 
Methods: Recent retirees were followed for 2 years. At the outset, participants completed 
measures of personality and reported on their demographics. Both types of measures 
were used as control variables. At years 1 and 2, individuals reported their subjective 
status. To assess health, the number of medical interventions each participant received in 
each year was obtained from the public health care system. Results: Individuals who had 
received more medical interventions in year 1 went on to report significantly lower 
subjective status in year 2. Subjective status in year 1 was unrelated to medical 
interventions in year 2. Outcome:  Results suggest that poorer health may lead individuals 
to negatively reappraise their standing in society. Future research on the impact of 




Subjective social status is a person’s sense of his or her relative rank in society in 
terms of education, occupation, and income (Adler et al., 2000). Based on largely cross-
sectional research, it has been argued that lower subjective status is a risk factor for 
illness, above and beyond actual differences in education, occupation, and income (e.g., 
Adler et al., 2000; Demakakos et al., 2008; Singh-Manoux et al., 2003). This impact of 
subjective status seems evident, even though subjective status has been argued to be a 
cognitive average of these same objective conditions of education, occupation, and 
income (Singh-Manoux et al., 2003). However, Alfonsi, Conway, and Pushkar (2011) 
called this cognitive averaging view into account, in demonstrating that the core 
personality traits of neuroticism and extraversion influence subjective status via multiple 
pathways. Although prior research has taken acute negative affect into account (Adler et 
al., 2000), negative affect is not a means by which neuroticism influences subjective 
status (Alfonsi et al., 2011). One mean by which neuroticism influenced subjective status 
was via self-reported health: more neurotic individuals reported more severe illnesses, 
which in turn predicted lower subjective status. As such, subjective health seems to 
determine subjective status.  
 The objective of the present research was to further examine health as a possible 
determinant of subjective status. The broken wing hypothesis was that poorer health leads 
to lower subjective status. A bird with a broken wing may withdraw and avoid outright 
social competition. Similarly, when humans are ill, their appraisal of their own social 
rank may drop. Several lines of argumentation support this hypothesis. Individuals who 
are ill or who have recently been sick may adopt a more passive social style, which may 
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result in a generally diminished sense of social rank. Individuals who are ill may socialize 
less frequently, need greater care and are unable to reciprocate, may feel victimized, 
powerless, more dependent, and may need to passively be the object of others’ 
interventions (Kelley, 1998). These issues may arise with more severe illness, and 
particularly with chronic conditions – which are more common in older adults (National 
Center for Health Statistics, 1994). Further support for this position can be found in 
research demonstrating that people have less of a sense of control when hospitalized for 
long periods of time (Halfens, 1995). From another perspective, given that people who 
are or who have recently been ill are more vulnerable to further infection,  it can be 
argued on the basis of Schaller’s (2006) evolutionary theory of the behavioural immune 
system that these individuals are particularly likely to act in a more introverted manner. 
Another means by which illness may influence subjective status is that someone who is 
ill may feel financially threatened. Indeed, chronic illness is associated with drops in 
socioeconomic status (Stenbeck & Hjern, 2007). In sum, illness may lead to a drop in 
subjective status through a variety of means. 
 In the present study, the usage for two years of the public health care system of a 
moderately large sample of older adults was considered in order to examine how the 
number of medical interventions they received was related to their subjective status. The 
study was conducted in the province of Quebec, Canada, in which the vast majority of 
medical interventions are conducted within the public health care system (Régie de 
l'assurance maladie du Québec, 2011) – records of interventions were obtained from this 
public agency. The present study builds on prior research in which self-reported illness 
was associated with lower subjective status (Alfonsi et al., 2011). The present study was 
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based on the same large scale longitudinal project as the research by Alfonsi and 
colleagues, with the addition of new data regarding medical interventions. The broken 
wing hypothesis was that greater number of medical interventions predicts less subjective 
status in the subsequent year. In addition, the alternative model based on the original 
conceptualization of subjective status (Adler et al., 2000) was also tested, whereby 
subjective status predicts  more medical interventions in the subsequent year. 
Method 
Participants  
 The original sample consisted of 433 recent retirees recruited from the community 
and was the same sample as in Alfonsi and colleagues (2011). Of these, 84% consented 
to have their health records released. Data from participants who did not complete all 
measures (i.e., non-completers) was excluded. The significant differences between 
completers and non-completers were that completers retired from more prestigious 
occupations (M = 53.86, SD = 8.03) than non-completers (M = 51.28, SD = 9.22), t(431) 
= 2.75, p < .01, and received less medical interventions in the second year (M = 12.29, 
SD = 12.47) than non-completers (M = 17.68, SD = 20.80),  t(361) = 2.22, p < .05. The 
final sample consisted of 170 women and 159 men (Mage = 59.0 years; range 44 – 77). 
Ethnicity data was not collected. Most participants appeared of European origin.  
Materials 
The NEO Five Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI; Costa & McCrae, 1992). Neuroticism 
and extraversion were assessed with the 60-item NEO-FFI which measures the five core 
dimensions of personality.  
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The MacArthur Scale of Subjective Social Status (SSS; Adler et al., 2000). The 
SSS is a line drawing of a ladder with 10 rungs. The ladder is described as representing 
people’s relative position in society in terms of education, occupation, and income. 
Respondents make a mark on the rung that represents their perception of where they 
stand. Higher on the ladder represents having more education, a better job, and more 
income than others in society. Instructions were modified for the present sample of recent 
retirees as the participants were asked to consider the job from which they had retired 
when responding to the SSS.  
Medical Interventions. The number of medical interventions each participant 
received in the year was obtained from the public health insurance agency in the province 
of Quebec. The public health care system is universal and offered to all residents. 
Medical interventions include visits to physicians’ offices, clinics and hospitals, and 
include medical acts, such as general examinations, minor surgery, providing 
prescriptions, and specialized exams or tests. For each participant, the total number of 
interventions was derived for each 1 year period. 
Demographics Questionnaire. Participants reported their age, gender, education, 
and income just prior to retirement. In addition, participants reported the occupation from 
which they had retired, which was coded using the Standard International Occupational 
Prestige Scale (SIOPS; Ganzeboom & Treiman, 1996; Treiman, 1977). 
Procedure 
 The study was conducted in accord with the ethical guidelines in place at the 
university. Participant consent for self-report measures was obtained at the outset of the 
study. Participants completed a packet of measures in small groups on three testing 
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sessions each scheduled a year apart. At the outset of the study, participants completed 
the NEO-FFI as well as providing demographic information. Personality (neuroticism 
and extraversion) and demographics (age, gender, education, occupation, and salary) 
were controlled for in the analyses. One (Time 1) and two years later (Time 2), 
participants completed the SSS. Participants’ consent for access to their medical records 
was obtained at Time 2 (see Appendix E). 
Results 
 Participants had relatively high education (M =14.92 years, SD = 2.41) and salary 
at retirement (M = 61,500 CAD, range from 10,000 to 344,500). Participants’ health and 
status were relatively stable. Mean subjective status did not change from Time 1 (M = 
7.05, SD = 1.38) to Time 2 (M = 7.07, SD = 1.42), t < 1. However, there tended to be 
fewer medical interventions in the second (M = 12.29, SD = 12.47) than in the first year 
(M = 13.53, SD = 14.27), t(328) = 1.95, p = .053.  
Structural equation modeling (SEM; Kline, 2005) was used with a latent change 
score approach (McArdle, 2009). Indices of model fit were those used in earlier work 
with this sample (Alfonsi et al., 2011), which included the maximum likelihood robust 
estimator to adjust for multivariate kurtosis (Normalized Mardia’s coefficient was 32.43). 
Medical interventions and subjective status were residualized to control for neuroticism, 
extraversion, age, gender, education, occupational prestige, and salary. As such, the 
analyses controlled for core personality characteristics as well as socioeconomic status. 
The proposed model included the following paths. In line with the broken wing 
hypothesis, initial number of medical interventions was expected to predict lower 
subjective status. Given the hypothesis, it was also expected that there would be, both 
61 
initially and for change scores, a negative correlation between medical interventions and 
subjective status. The proposed model had good fit, S-Bχ² (1) = .02, p = .88, CFI = 1, 
RMSEA < .001, CI = .00 – .07, with no residuals greater than .10 (see Figure 2). As 
hypothesized, individuals who received more medical interventions in the year prior to 
Time 1 had lower subjective status at Time 2 relative to their peers (β = -.14, z = -2.79, p 
< .01). There was no significant correlation between initial levels (β = -.07, z = -.96, p = 
.34), or change scores (β = -.04, z = -.75, p = .45) for medical interventions and subjective 
status. An alternative model was tested in which initial subjective status predicted change 
in medical interventions, with no path from initial medical interventions to change in 
subjective status. The alternative model had poor fit, S-Bχ² (1) = 5.79, p = .016, CFI = 
.95, RMSEA  = .12, CI = .04 – .22, with a large residual (-.15) between Time 1 medical 
interventions and Time 2 subjective status. The path between initial subjective status and 
change in medical interventions was non-significant (β = .01, z = .14, p = .89). In sum, 
the alternative model was not viable. 
Discussion 
In the present study, those individuals who received more medical interventions in 
one year had lower subjective status relative to their peers a year later. There was no 
correlation for either initial levels or amount of change observed a year later between 
number of medical interventions and subjective status. There was a lag effect, whereby 
the consequences of medical interventions were apparent a full year later. Whatever 
influence medical interventions has on subjective status seems likely to unfold gradually 
over time. In an alternative model – based on the view that subjective status impacts 




















Figure 2. The final model of medical interventions and subjective status. *p < .05; **p < 
.01; ***p < .001. Neuroticism, extraversion, age, gender, education, occupational 
prestige, and salary were controlled for in the present model. The medical interventions 
construct represents the total number of medical interventions received in the preceding 
year. Dashed paths are nonsignificant. Paths without coefficients are set to 1, which are 
the paths that lead to Time 2 measures. Time 2 measures are fully predicted by the 
corresponding Time 1 measures and the corresponding latent variables, which capture 
change. The negative beta coefficients from Time 1 variables to the corresponding 
change latent variables reflect regression toward the mean. 
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the following year. In sum, the findings support the broken wing hypothesis, whereby 
worse health leads to decreased subjective status. 
 In the present study, number of medical interventions was the objective measure 
of worse health. This measure was independent of reporting bias on the part of 
participants. The measure was based on physicians’ report on the number of billable acts 
performed on each participant –physicians are motivated to reliably report these acts to 
the public health agency. More medical interventions can be taken to reflect worse health, 
but other factors may influence number of treatments received, such as participants’ 
health behaviours. When ill, some participants might seek out treatment more than others, 
which would result in more medical interventions. As well, physicians’ diagnoses will in 
part determine subsequent medical interventions, and such diagnoses are often based on 
judgments that involve uncertainty in terms of patients’ actual health condition. Despite 
these reservations, number of medical interventions seems a good measure of worse 
health. In correlations not reported here (Alfonsi, 2011), participants in the present 
sample with more medical interventions reported more severe illness (the latter measure 
is reported in Alfonsi et al., 2011). 
 There was no support in the present study or in previous research with this sample 
(Alfonsi et al., 2011) for the commonly held view in most scientific research on 
subjective status that subjective status determines health, which is the converse of the 
broken wing hypothesis. The present study did not find a link between subjective status 
and subsequent number of medical interventions received. The current findings are at 
odds with a large body of prior research. However, this prior research is largely cross-
sectional, did not control for medical history, and did not control for core personality 
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characteristics. Given these limitations and the present findings, it is an outstanding 
question as to whether an individual having lower subjective status is consequently at 
greater risk for illness.  
 The broken wing hypothesis that worse health leads to lower subjective status was 
supported in the present study. Subjective status may be influenced by many factors 
including individual differences in neuroticism and extraversion, reported illnesses 
(Alfonsi et al., 2011), and as demonstrated here, the number of medical interventions 
received. Support for the broken wing hypothesis suggests that people spontaneously 
assess their social rank, in part, on their physical health. A more general conclusion is 
that people’s physical health has a significant impact on how they see themselves in the 








Is Subjective Social Status Consequential?  





People have a subjective sense of their standing in society, in terms of education, 
occupation, and income. Much research implies that this subjective social status has 
major implications in people’s lives, including their perceived control. However, prior 
research took socioeconomic status into account but did not consider neuroticism and 
extraversion. Study 1 was a cross-sectional study with young adults (N = 399) and Study 
2 was a 3-year longitudinal study with recent retirees (N = 340). In Study 1, subjective 
status and perceived control were not significantly related after accounting for 
neuroticism, extraversion, and socioeconomic status. In Study 2, controlling for 
personality and socioeconomic status, greater perceived control predicted higher 
subjective status, both directly and via satisfaction with finances. Subjective status was 
not a determinant of perceived control. The present findings contribute to the ongoing 




Social rank is a basic feature in many social settings, and individuals differ in 
their social rank in society at large. People have been shown to have their own evaluation 
of their social rank in society (Adler et al., 2000), and much research seems to indicate 
that such subjective social status influences many aspects of people’s lives, including 
their physical health (e.g., Adler et al., 2000), their psychological adjustment (e.g., 
Demakakos et al., 2008), and their social cognition (e.g., Kraus et al., 2009). With regard 
to social cognition, people with lower subjective status have been shown to perceive less 
control in their lives, and this lack of control is associated with seeing others’ life events 
as more due to external, situational factors (Kraus et al., 2009). In the latter research, 
which was largely cross-sectional, a causal model was proposed whereby subjective 
social status influences people’s sense of control which, in turn, affects perceptions of the 
causes of life events (for other cross-sectional research linking subjective status and 
perceived control, see Lundberg & Kristenson, 2008 and Singh-Manoux et al., 2003).  
Doubts can be raised regarding the causal effect of subjective status on perceived 
control. A major concern is that other personality characteristics underlie both subjective 
status and perceived control. Higher neuroticism (N) and lower extraversion (E) are 
associated with lower subjective social status (Alfonsi et al., 2011) and lower perceived 
control (Judge et al., 2002; Prenda & Lachman, 2001). As such, neuroticism and 
extraversion may be similar to socioeconomic status (SES) in determining both 
subjective status and perceived control. Individuals higher in SES have greater subjective 
status (Singh-Manoux et al., 2003) and greater perceived control (Lachman & Weaver, 
1998). Given the influence of these core aspects of personality and of SES, the NE-SES 
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hypothesis in the present studies is that most of the association observed in prior research 
between subjective status and perceived control is largely due to individual differences in 
neuroticism and extraversion, as well as to SES. More importantly, we also propose the 
perceived control hypothesis that it is individuals’ level of perceived control that 
influences their subjective social status. That is, the causality argument here is opposite to 
that of Kraus and colleagues (2009), and is grounded in the strong association of 
perceived control to neuroticism, and in the great impact of both these variables that has 
been observed in a wide range of research. The financial satisfaction hypothesis is that 
the influence of perceived control on subjective status is due in part to the increased 
satisfaction individuals with higher perceived control have with their financial situation. 
If one considers the broad significance of neuroticism and extraversion in 
individual functioning and adjustment, it is not surprising that these core aspects of 
personality may also influence individuals’ subjective social status. Neuroticism and 
extraversion have been extensively studied (e.g., Costa & McCrae, 1992; Eysenck, 1967). 
Neuroticism has a large genetic component (Jang et al., 1996; Weiss et al., 2008), and is 
relatively stable. Individuals who are higher in neuroticism experience more negative 
moods and emotions (Watson, 2000). Neuroticism is related to negative outcomes 
including poorer well-being (Weiss et al., 2008), greater depression (Kendler et al., 
2006), higher rates of divorce, poorer occupational attainment, and greater mortality 
(Roberts et al., 2007). Indeed, greater neuroticism leads to lower subjective status via 
multiple mechanisms, including lower occupational attainment, lower salary, and illness 
(Alfonsi et al., 2011).  
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Just as individuals higher in neuroticism have lower subjective status, individuals 
who are more extraverted have higher subjective status (Alfonsi et al., 2011). Similar to 
neuroticism, extraversion is highly heritable (Weiss et al., 2008). Extraversion includes a 
greater tendency to experience positive affect and greater sociability (e.g., Lucas et al., 
2008). More extraverted individuals generally experience better socioemotional 
outcomes, which include having greater well-being (Weiss et al., 2008), being attributed 
higher status in peer groups (Anderson et al., 2001), and being perceived as more 
physically attractive by judges presented their photographs (Meier et al., 2010). Prior 
research indicates that physical attractiveness is a status cue (Kalick, 1988). These might 
be some of the mechanisms by which extraversion leads to higher subjective status. 
Just as neuroticism and extraversion are linked to significant life outcomes, 
perceived control has important ramifications for individuals’ physical and psychological 
health. Perceived control predicts major psychosocial outcomes, with individuals who 
perceive more control in their lives being less depressed, and having better self-reported 
health (Lachman & Weaver, 1998; Lent et al., 2005). In fact, perceived control may play 
a role in explaining how SES is linked to health, with individuals of higher SES 
experiencing higher perceived control which, in part, explains their better health (Moore 
et al., 2010). Part of this health effect may be due to the protective influence higher 
perceived control confers against the physiological effects of stress. For example, 
individuals who are given a sense of control show less physiological activation when 
injected with a chemical stressor (Abelson et al., 2008). Perceived control is not only a 
predictor of positive outcomes such as social support and health, but also appears to be 
predicted in turn by these latter variables, suggesting a dynamic relation of mutual 
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influence (Gerstorf et al., 2011). The strongest evidence for the effects of perceived 
control on health has been found with older adults, perhaps because the effects of 
perceived control on health accumulate over the life-span (Infurna et al., 2011). 
Both perceived control and neuroticism are strongly linked dimensions of 
personality (Judge et al., 2002), and both may act to influence a wide range of outcomes, 
including individuals’ subjective social status. Mechanisms by which neuroticism can 
influence subjective status were identified above, and include lower SES and greater 
illness. Perceived control may influence subjective status as well. Perceived control is a 
predictor of both global life satisfaction as well as satisfaction with a variety of specific 
life domains, such as for one’s social life (Lachman & Weaver, 1998; Lent et al., 2005).  
People higher in perceived control may be more satisfied with their finances, their 
education, and occupation, and such feelings of satisfaction may in turn lead them to have 
higher subjective status. Individuals with greater perceived control are more satisfied 
with their finances independent of their financial situation (Zurlo, 2010). With regard to 
education, students with higher self-efficacy, which is analogous to the personal mastery 
component of perceived control (Lachman & Weaver, 1998), are more satisfied with their 
academic pursuits (Lent et al., 2005). One implication of the latter finding is that people 
who are higher in perceived control may generally be more satisfied with their 
educational attainment. In addition, greater perceived control is associated with greater 
satisfaction with one’s occupation. In a study of nurses (McGilton & Pringle, 1999), 
higher perceived control in their work was linked to higher job satisfaction. In sum, 
individuals with higher perceived control are more likely to be satisfied with their 
financial situation, their education, and their occupation, which implies greater subjective 
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status. Indeed, the subjective status rating is in terms of finances, education, and 
occupation (Adler et al., 2000). Satisfaction with one’s current standard of living has 
been identified as an important determinant of subjective status (Singh-Manoux et al., 
2003). 
In addition to the influence of neuroticism and extraversion, one can doubt on 
conceptual grounds that subjective status influences perceived control, which is the 
causal model currently favored in this domain of research. First, having low subjective 
status from a society-large perspective may not necessarily have a negative impact on an 
individual, in terms of adjustment. Consider the well demonstrated high self-esteem of 
individuals who are members of disadvantaged groups, or members of groups that suffer 
discrimination (Crocker & Blanton, 1999). Second, people may be more sensitive to the 
degree of congruence between characteristics that normally define their objective social 
status than to their level of overall objective social status: people with lower status 
occupations were distressed if they were overqualified, in terms of education, for their 
positions (Lundberg, Kristenson, & Starrin, 2009).  
The importance of subjective status is also undermined by other findings that 
downplay the importance of status in even face to face encounters. Not all people strive 
for higher status in group settings; some are more at ease with lower status. For instance, 
individuals with lower testosterone, a hormone associated with social rank, display worse 
cognitive functioning, greater attention to status-related stimuli, and greater emotional 
arousal when placed into a position of dominance whereas individuals with higher 
testosterone show these effects when placed in a subordinate position (Josephs et al., 
2006). These findings imply that lower status does not represent a lack of control for all 
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individuals as some individuals actually do better with lower social rank. In sum, the 
argued ill effects of lower subjective status may be overstated. 
There were three hypotheses in the present studies. In Study 1 conducted with 
young adults, the NE-SES hypothesis was that individual differences in neuroticism and 
extraversion as well as SES account for most of the association observed in prior research 
between subjective status and perceived control (Kraus et al., 2009; Lundberg & 
Kristenson, 2008; Singh-Manoux et al., 2003). Study 2 was a 3-year longitudinal study 
conducted with recent retirees. All three hypotheses were considered in Study 2. In 
addition to the NE-SES hypothesis, the perceived control hypothesis was that greater 
perceived control predicts greater subjective status. The financial satisfaction hypothesis 
was that greater perceived control leads to more satisfaction with one’s financial 
situation, which in turn leads to greater subjective status. The present studies did not 
address the possibilities raised above that perceived control may also lead to greater 
satisfaction with one’s education and occupation, which could in turn lead to higher 
subjective status.  
The present studies were conducted to address the view that subjective status 
influences perceived control. From the perspective of this earlier research (Kraus et al., 
2009; Lundberg & Kristenson, 2008; Singh-Manoux et al., 2003), perceived control is 
considered a unitary construct, and there is no reference to neuroticism. It is for this 
reason that the hypotheses distinguish between the impact of neuroticism and of 





In line with the NE-SES hypothesis, the expectation in Study 1 was that for young 
adults, the positive association between perceived control and subjective status is modest 
in a model that accounts for the contribution of neuroticism, extraversion, and SES. The 
methodology of Study 1 was close to that adopted in Study 3 of Kraus and colleagues 
(2009), as one goal of Study 1 was to speak directly to their findings. In particular, a 
measure of contextual explanations for life events was included, as in their Study 3. In 
the present study, less perceived control was expected to predict more contextual 
explanations, which would replicate the effect observed in Study 3 of Kraus and 
colleagues (2009). We did not expect this perceived control-explanations link to be 
attenuated by the inclusion of other personality traits in the model. 
Neuroticism, extraversion, and SES were all expected to be related to both 
subjective status and perceived control. It was expected that individuals higher in 
extraversion, lower in neuroticism, and with parents of higher education would be higher 
in both subjective status and perceived control. In line with Kraus and colleagues (2009), 
parental education was used as a marker of SES for the participants, who were 
undergraduate university students.  
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
Participants were individuals who approached a booth at which the sign read 
Psychology Project Volunteers Needed, which was located on a university campus. 
Participants completed the measures at the booth (see Appendix F for the consent form 
used in the present study). They were given $2.50 CAD vouchers for a local coffee shop, 
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and became eligible for cash prizes. Of 425 completed questionnaire packets, 26 had 
excessive missing data. The final sample included 172 men and 227 women. Mean age 
was 22.76 years (range 18-34). Participants self-identified according to Census Canada 
categories, in decreasing order, as being White (57.7%), South Asian (8.6%), Chinese 
(7.3%), Latin American (6.6%), Black (4.3%), Arab (3.5%), Southeast Asian (1.3%), 
West Asian (1.3%), and Other (7.8%). Other categories were below 1%.  
Materials 
Perceived Control Scale (PCS; Lachman & Weaver, 1998). The PCS is a 12-item 
measure of perceptions of control and consists of two subscales: personal mastery (e.g., 
“Whether or not I am able to get what I want is in my own hands”) and perceived 
constraints (e.g., “There are many things that interfere with what I want to do”). 
Responses are on 7-point scales with endpoints strongly disagree (1) and strongly agree 
(7). A single control score was derived by summing the standardized scores on both 
subscales (cf., Kraus et al., 2009). Higher scores represent more perceived control. The 
PCS possesses good psychometric properties (Lachman & Weaver, 1998).  
The MacArthur Scale of Subjective Social Status (SSS; Adler et al., 2000). The 
SSS is a line drawing of a 10 rung ladder on which individuals represent their relative 
ranking in society in terms of education, occupation, and income (see Appendix G). 
Participants make a mark on the rung that best represents their own position, with a 
higher rung indicating higher rank. Rungs are scored from 1 to 10, with higher numbers 
for higher status. The SSS has adequate test-retest reliability and correlates positively 
with measures of SES (Adler et al., 2000; Operario et al., 2004; Singh-Manoux et al., 
2003). 
75 
The NEO Five Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI; Costa & McCrae, 1992). Neuroticism 
and extraversion were measured using the NEO-FFI, which is a 60-item measure of the 
Big Five personality dimensions. Participants respond on 5-point scales with endpoints 
strongly disagree (1) and strongly agree (5). The NEO-FFI has strong test-retest 
reliability (Murray et al., 2003), and adequate internal consistency for its subscales 
(Holden & Fekken, 1994).  
 Contextual Explanations Scale. This scale was based on the 8-item measure of 
appraisals of responsibility for life events developed and used by Kraus and colleagues 
(2009). Their measure was of perceptions of responsibility (which can be distinct from 
perceptions of causality; see Shaver & Drown, 1986). Each item was a description of a 
life event that might be experienced by young adults. For the present study, items were 
slightly modified (see Appendix H) and were “Getting into a good university professional 
program (e.g., MBA),” “Having low income,” “Getting good medical care,” “Contracting 
a sexually transmitted disease,” “Getting a full-time job at a prestigious company,” 
“Failing a class at school,” “Being overweight,” and “Having to put in extra hours at 
work.” For each item, participants responded on a 7-point scale with endpoints individual 
is 100% responsible (1) and outside forces are 100% responsible (7). An overall mean 
score was derived. 
 Socioeconomic Status. SES was assessed by having participants report their 
mother’s and father’s highest levels of education (see Appendix I for demographics 
questionnaire). Options were primary school (1), secondary school (2), technical degree 
(3), university undergraduate degree (4), and university graduate degree (5). A mean 
parental education score was derived for each participant.  
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Results 
Approximately half of participants reported having fathers (51.6%) or mothers 
(50.4%) with university degrees. Most participants viewed themselves as being towards 
the middle of the subjective status ladder (M = 5.45, SD = 1.64), and tended to attribute 
responsibility for life outcomes (M = 3.07, SD = .74) somewhat more to the individual 
than to the environment. Subjective status and perceived control were positively 
correlated (r = .17) with individuals higher on both also less likely to attribute events to 
contextual factors (See Table II for correlations). Finally, internal reliability for the 
Contextual Explanations Scale was adequate (α = .68).  
 Personality, Status, and Contextual Explanations  
 The NE-SES hypothesis was tested using path analysis conducted with structural 
equation modeling (SEM; Kline, 2005). Model goodness of fit was evaluated using the 
following criteria: a nonsignificant chi-square (χ²), a comparative fit index (CFI) close to 
1, a root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) less than or equal to .05, and a 
90% confidence interval (CI) within the range of 0 to .08. Given that there was a high 
level of multivariate kurtosis (normalized Mardia’s coefficient equal to 3.24), SEM was 
conducted using the maximum likelihood robust estimator for evaluating path 
coefficients and standard errors, and the Satorra-Bentler scaled chi-square (S-Bχ²) was 
used as a fit index.  
  Scores for all measures were residualized to control for age and gender (as in 
Study 2; results remain virtually the same in Study 1 if one does not control for age and  
gender). The proposed model included the expected relations outlined above, as well as 
an expected negative correlation between neuroticism and extraversion. The proposed 
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Table II 






















Note. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. N = 399. Gender was scored 1 for men and 2 for 
women. For all other measures, higher numbers mean more of the construct.  
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Subjective  
    Status 
—       
2. Perceived  
    Control 
 .17
**
 —      
3. Contextual 












 —    






 —   
6. Parental  





 -.07 -.05  .05 —  
7. Age -.07 -.03  .02 -.01 -.03 -.13
**
 — 
8. Gender -.05  .09 -.03  .05 .17
**
 -.02 -.07 
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 model provided a good fit to the data, S-Bχ² (6) = 4.30, p = .64, CFI = 1, RMSEA < 
.001, CI = .00 – .05, with no residuals above .10. However, three paths were 
nonsignificant: subjective status to perceived control, neuroticism to subjective status, 
and parental education to perceived control. Satorra-Bentler scaled chi-square difference 
tests (Satorra & Bentler, 2001) were computed using a specialized computer program 
(Sbdiff.exe; Crawford & Henry, 2003), for models in which each of the three 
nonsignificant paths were fixed to zero. Fixing the path from parental education to 
perceived control to zero significantly worsened model fit, S-Bχ ² diff (1) = 8.75, p < .01. 
However, fixing the paths to zero for either subjective status to perceived control, S-Bχ² 
diff (1) = 2.90, p = .09, or for neuroticism to subjective status, S-Bχ² diff (1) = .48, p = .49, 
did not worsen model fit. The resultant second model in which the latter two paths were 
omitted had good fit, S-Bχ² (8) = 7.52, p = .48, CFI = 1, RMSEA < .001, CI = .00 – .06, 
with all paths significant (see Figure 3).  
 The NE-SES hypothesis was supported in that taking neuroticism, extraversion, 
and SES into account, the association between subjective status and perceived control 
was weakened. As shown in Figure 3, there was no statistically significant relation 
remaining between subjective status and perceived control. The model indicates that 
extraversion and neuroticism underlies both subjective status and perceived control, 
generally as predicted. More extroverted individuals had higher subjective status (β = .21, 
z = 3.93, p < .001), and higher perceived control (β = .17, z = 3.50, p < .001). Lower 
neuroticism was associated with higher perceived control (β = -.48, z = -10.78, p < .001), 
but contrary to expectations was not significantly related to subjective status. As well, 




















Figure 3. The final model in Study 1. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
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 perceived control (β = .08, z = 1.96, p < .05). Additional paths in the model were 
between neuroticism and extraversion (β = -.34, z = -5.79, p < .001), and greater 
perceived control was associated with less attributions for life events to contextual factors 
(β = -.33, z = -6.82, p < .001). Finally, there were significant indirect effects from 
neuroticism (β = .16, z = 5.62, p < .001) and extraversion (β = -.05, z = -3.14, p < .01) to 
contextual explanations. These significant indirect effects represent the influence of 
neuroticism and extraversion on contextual explanations via perceived control. 
Discussion 
In Study 1, young adults who perceived themselves as lower in status in society at 
large, in terms of education, occupation, and income, did not see themselves as being less 
in control of their lives, if one took into account their neuroticism, extraversion, and SES. 
The NE-SES hypothesis was thereby supported. If one ignores the impact of these 3 
variables, there is a positive association between perceived control and subjective status, 
just as in prior research (Kraus et al., 2009; Lundberg & Kristenson, 2008; Singh-
Manoux et al., 2003). As well, in Study 1, higher perceived control was linked to a lesser 
tendency to attribute responsibility for life events to environmental forces. The latter 
finding is consistent with the results of Study 3 of Kraus and colleagues, which is the 
study we emulated in the design of the present Study 1. This relation between perceived 
control and contextual explanations remained even after accounting for neuroticism, 
extraversion, and SES.  
Whereas both neuroticism and extraversion predicted subjective status in previous 
research with older adults (Alfonsi et al., 2011), neuroticism and subjective status were 
unrelated in Study 1. Why the difference across the lifespan? Perhaps the negative effects 
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of neuroticism need to accumulate over the years in order to influence subjective social 
rank. More neurotic individuals experience greater negative life outcomes (Roberts et al., 
2007), and an accumulation of such negative events may lead more neurotic individuals 
to appraise their social rank more negatively. In contrast to neuroticism, higher 
extraversion was linked to higher subjective status in Study 1 and in prior research 
(Alfonsi et al., 2011). Extraversion is a trait associated with positive affect and greater 
sociability. Extraverted individuals may perceive themselves as higher in social rank 
because of a positive affect bias in self-perception, or because of their actually having 
higher status in their proximal social environments (Anderson et al., 2001; Kalick, 1988), 
and both these influences may be active across the adult lifespan. 
A limitation in Study 1 was the weaker zero-order correlation between subjective 
status and perceived control relative to that observed in Kraus and colleagues (2009). The 
zero-order correlation in Study 1 between subjective status and perceived control (r = 
.17) was lower than the corresponding correlations in Kraus and colleagues (2009), which 
ranged from .28 to .40. Perhaps starting with a larger zero-order correlation, one could 
account for neuroticism, extraversion, and SES, and there would remain a link between 
subjective status and perceived control. Given this type of argument, Study 2 was 
conducted to further address the relation between subjective status and perceived control. 
The expectation was that the observed zero-order correlation between subjective status 
and perceived control will be in line with Kraus and colleagues (2009). Contrary to Kraus 
and colleagues (2009), the predicted causal model in Study 2 was that perceived control 
predicts subjective status. Furthermore, the financial satisfaction hypothesis in Study 2 
was that the effect of perceived control on subjective status is due in part to greater 
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perceived control leading to more satisfaction with one’s finances, which in turn leads to 
greater subjective status.  
Study 2 
A sample of recent retirees was recruited as part of a larger longitudinal study on 
the transition to retirement; this is the sample on which the research of Alfonsi and 
colleagues (2011) was based. In comparison to Alfonsi and colleagues (2011), we are 
focusing in the present Study 2 on data that is for a longer time period, and for a 
somewhat different range of variables. In Study 2, a model was proposed in which 
perceived control, financial satisfaction, and subjective status were related over three 
years. In addition to the NE-SES hypothesis, Study 2 addressed the perceived control and 
the financial satisfaction hypotheses. An alternative account was also considered in which 
subjective status directly predicts perceived control, and via financial satisfaction 
(consistent with the arguments made in Kraus et al., 2009). At the outset of the study, 
measures of individuals’ socioeconomic standing, neuroticism, and extraversion were 
collected. One, two, and three years later, measures of participants’ perceived control, 
financial satisfaction, and subjective status were collected.  
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
 A sample of 433 recent retirees was recruited through local community groups 
and through advertisements targeting retirees in local newspapers. All participants had 
worked full-time for at least 20 years prior to retirement and were not currently working 
more than 10 hours per week. Participants attended 4 sessions in a laboratory setting, 
each scheduled one year apart. During each session, participants completed a packet of 
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measures for a comprehensive longitudinal study on retirement of which the current 
research is a part. No more than 6 participants were present at any one session and 
participants were paid 50$ CAD per session. At the first session, participants completed 
the NEO-FFI and reported on their SES. At sessions two (Time 1), three (Time 2), and 
four (Time 3), participants completed the PCS, the SSS, and reported on their financial 
satisfaction. 
 Data from 93 participants was excluded due to excessive missing data, or because 
they dropped out of the study. There were significant mean differences between 
participants who completed all measures and those that did not. Completers were 
younger, t(431) = 2.30, p < .05, retired from higher prestige occupations, t(431) = 4.11, p 
< .001, had higher satisfaction with their finances at Time 1, t(391) = 2.79, p < .01, Time 
2, t(371) = 3.63, p < .001, and Time 3, t(351) = 1.98, p < .05, and had greater perceived 
control but only at Time 3, t(351) = 2.11, p < .05. No other significant differences were 
found between completers and non-completers. The final sample was composed of 164 
men and 176 women. Mean age was 58.90 years (range: 44 - 77). Participants did not 
report their ethnic or cultural background. The vast majority seemed of European 
ancestry. 
Materials 
PCS, SSS, and NEO-FFI. The measures of perceived control, subjective status, 
and of neuroticism and extraversion were the same as in Study 1, save that the SSS 
instructions were modified. Participants were asked to consider their ranking in terms of 
the occupation from which they had retired. Note that for Study 2, an unstandardized 
mean score for the PCS was used to permit testing of mean differences across years.  
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Financial Satisfaction. Participants responded to the item “How satisfied are you 
with your financial situation?” on a 5-point scale with endpoints not at all (1) and very 
much (5). Participants were instructed to answer this item in terms of how they feel in the 
present moment. 
 SES. Participants reported years of education they had received, their salary just 
prior to their retirement, and the occupation from which they retired. Occupations were 
scored on the Standard International Occupational Prestige Scale (SIOPS; Ganzeboom & 
Treiman, 1996; Treiman, 1977), which assesses the level of respect and prestige with 
which occupations are viewed within society. Education, salary, and occupational 
prestige were the SES indicators controlled for in the model.  
Results 
Participants had on average 15.0 years of schooling (range: 7 - 21), and retired 
with salaries that were on average $62,500 CAD per year (range: $10,000 -$345,000), 
which was above the national average (Statistics Canada, 2006). Zero-order correlations 
were in line with expectations and are in Table III. Concurrent subjective status and 
perceived control were significantly positively correlated in each of the three years (rs of 
.26, .31, and 30 at Time 1, 2, and 3, respectively).  
Score Stability 
Mean scores on subjective status, financial satisfaction, and perceived control 
were generally stable. There was no difference for subjective status between Time 1 (M = 
7.05, SD = 1.35) and Time 2 (M = 7.11, SD = 1.38), t < 1, or between Time 2 and Time 3 
(M = 7.13, SD = 1.28), t < 1. Nor was there any difference for satisfaction with finances 
between Time 1 (M = 3.80, SD = .82) and Time 2 (M = 3.83, SD = .82), t < 1, or between  
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Table III  
Zero-order correlations between measures in Study 2 
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 
1. T1  Subjective Status —     
2. T2  Subjective Status  .59
***
 —    




 —   






 —  

















































































  .03  .01 






  .02  .03 


























 -.03 -.01 
86 
Table III (continued) 
Zero-order correlations between measures in Study 2
Measure 6 7 8 9 10 
1. T1  Subjective Status      
2. T2  Subjective Status      
3. T3  Subjective Status      
4. T1  Perceived Control      
5. T2  Perceived Control      
6. T3  Perceived Control —     
7. T1 Financial Satisfaction  .17
**
 —    
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12. Education -.06  .08 -.02 -.04 -.06 
13. Occupation -.01  .08  .02 -.02 -.15
**
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Table III (continued) 















Note. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. N = 340. Gender was scored 1 for men and 2 for 
women. T1, T2, and T3 measurements occurred each 1 year apart. For all measures save 
gender, higher numbers mean more of the construct. 
Measure 11 12 13 14 15 
1. T1  Subjective Status      
2. T2  Subjective Status      
3. T3  Subjective Status      
4. T1  Perceived Control      
5. T2  Perceived Control      
6. T3  Perceived Control      
7. T1 Financial Satisfaction      
8. T2 Financial Satisfaction      
9. T3 Financial Satisfaction      
10. Neuroticism      
11. Extraversion —     
12. Education -.09 —    
13. Occupation  .01  .57
***
 —   




 —  
15. Age  -10  .12
*
  .06 -.17
**
 — 




Time 2 and Time 3 (M = 3.79, SD = .86), t < 1. Perceived control did change over time, 
though slightly, with a drop from Time 1 (M = 5.72, SD = .85) to Time 2 (M = 5.64, SD 
= .89), t(339) = 2.47, p < .05. Perceived control did not change from Time 2 to Time 3 (M 
= 5.67, SD = .84), t < 1. 
Perceived Control, Financial Satisfaction, and Subjective Status  
 The same criteria were used to evaluate model fit as in Study 1. Given that there 
was a high level of multivariate kurtosis (normalized Mardia’s coefficient equal to 
14.61), SEM was conducted as in Study 1. Age, gender, extraversion, and socioeconomic 
status were controlled for by residualizing the scores of neuroticism, subjective status, 
perceived control, and financial satisfaction. Neuroticism was included in the path model 
because of its strong ties to perceived control (Judge et al., 2002), and because of its 
importance in predicting subjective status (Alfonsi et al., 2011). The paths in the model 
were as follows. First, higher neuroticism predicted lower perceived control and lower 
subjective status at Time 1. At Times 1, 2, and 3, greater perceived control predicted 
higher financial satisfaction, which in turn predicted higher subjective status. As well, 
there was a direct path from greater perceived control to higher subjective status. Paths 
across time for the respective constructs were included to reflect temporal stability. 
 The proposed model provided a good fit to the data, S-Bχ² (25) = 18.56, p = .82, 
CFI = 1, RMSEA < .001, CI = .00 – .03, with no large residuals (all below .10, except for 
one at .105). However, three paths were nonsignificant: neuroticism to Time 1 subjective 
status, Time 1 perceived control to Time 1 subjective status, and Time 3 perceived 
control to Time 3 subjective status (this latter path was a trend, p = .06). A series of S-Bχ² 
difference tests was conducted. Fixing the path to zero did not significantly worsen model 
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fit for either the path from neuroticism to Time 1 subjective status, S-Bχ ² diff (1) = 2.06, p 
= .15, or for the path from Time 1 perceived control to Time 1 subjective status, S-Bχ ² 
diff (1) = 2.01, p = .16. However, fixing both paths to zero in the same model did 
significantly worsen model fit, S-Bχ ² diff (2) = 6.35, p < .05, the implication being that at 
least one path should be retained. In sum, the models were largely equivalent whether 
neuroticism directly predicted subjective status or whether perceived control directly 
predicted subjective status. This may reflect the strong association between neuroticism 
and perceived control (Judge et al., 2002).  
 Given the statistical equivalence between models, we opted for the model in 
which Time 1 perceived control predicted Time 1 subjective status on grounds of 
conceptual coherence as paths were observed from perceived control to subjective status 
in the two subsequent years. Below we note that the nearly equivalent results for the 
model in which the path from neuroticism to Time 1 subjective status was retained. This 
final model (with the path from Time 1 perceived control to Time 1 subjective status)  
had good fit, S-Bχ² (26) = 20.53, p = .77, CFI = 1, RMSEA < .001, CI = .00 – .03, with 
no large residuals, and with all paths significant save the path between Time 3 perceived 
control to Time 3 subjective status, which remained a trend (see Figure 4).  
 The perceived control hypothesis was supported. There was a direct influence of 
perceived control on subjective status in all three years, though this association was 
marginally significant (p = .06) at Time 3. The financial satisfaction hypothesis was also 
supported in that in all three years, participants with higher perceived control were more 
satisfied with their finances, and in turn saw themselves as having higher status (see 
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Figure 4. The final model of subjective status, financial satisfaction, and perceived control in 
Study 2. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.Times 1, 2, and 3 each occurred a year apart. Note that 
extraversion, SES, age, and gender were controlled for in the model. The dashed line indicates a 
non-significant path that nonetheless remained a trend. 
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status, via financial satisfaction, was significant at Time 1 (β = .05, z = 2.56, p < .05), 
Time 2 (β = .03, z = 2.22, p < .05), and Time 3 (β = .02, z = 2.16, p < .05).  
 The NE-SES hypothesis was also supported. The zero-order correlation between 
perceived control and subjective status was in the .26 -.31 range at each time point, yet 
one can observe in the model in Figure 4 that the direct path from perceived control to 
subjective status was in the .09 - .11 range, and the indirect paths were in the .02 - .05 
range. In other words, the shared variance implied by the zero-order correlation was in 
the 6.76% - 9.61% range, whereas the results of the model indicate shared variance in the 
.85% - 1.46% range. As such, the drop in shared variance is 78% for Time 1, and is even 
greater in subsequent years. Finally, subjective status, perceived control, and financial 
satisfaction showed stability across all three years.  
 An alternative model was tested in which subjective status determines perceived 
control directly, and via financial satisfaction. The model was the same as the model in 
Figure 4 except all concurrent paths between subjective status, perceived control, and 
financial satisfaction were reversed. In this alternative model, people with higher 
subjective status are more satisfied with their finances, which in part explains their higher 
perceived control. The alternative model (with the same degrees of freedom) had poor fit 
to the data, Bχ² (26) = 44.10, p = .01, CFI = 98, RMSEA = .05, CI = .02 – .07, with 12 
residuals over .10, and several non-significant paths. On these grounds, the alternative 
model was rejected in favor of the model in Figure 4. Note as well that some of the 
residuals for the alternative model were for paths that seem contrary to the theoretical 
account advanced by which subjective status determines perceived control (Kraus et al., 
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2009). Notably, there were residuals for the path from Time 1 perceived control to Time 
3 subjective status, and from Time 2 perceived control to Time 3 subjective status.  
 Finally, the same results emerged whether the alternative model was based on the 
model from Figure 4 or it was based on the statistically equivalent model in which 
neuroticism predicted Time 1 subjective status, without a path from perceived control to 
subjective status at Time 1. Starting from the equivalent model and reversing the paths 
between subjective status, perceived control, and financial situation still resulted in a 
poorly fitting model. 
General Discussion 
The findings of Study 2 indicate that individuals with higher perceived control 
have higher subjective status, and this relation is partly explained by higher perceived 
control individuals being more satisfied with their finances. Furthermore, the opposite 
relation in which higher subjective status leads to higher perceived control was 
unsupported. In addition, a direct (small) path remained from perceived control to 
subjective status. As mentioned above, perceived control may relate to subjective status 
not just through financial satisfaction, but through academic and job satisfaction as well. 
However, as the latter two constructs were not examined in the present research, it 
remains unclear how satisfaction with these other facets of SES might explain the link 
between perceived control and subjective status.  
Perceived control seems to be a core feature of personality, as perceived control 
has been strongly linked to the heritable, highly stable trait of neuroticism (Judge et al., 
2002). Even as perceived control may be a core facet of personality, control beliefs do 
appear to be influenced by cultural context. For instance, there are subtle differences in 
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how control beliefs are structured for Chinese versus American school children (Liu & 
Yussen, 2005). However, the consequences of perceived control appear to be universal. 
For instance, greater perceptions of control were linked to higher well-being in a study of 
97 countries (Minkov, 2009). In sum, perceived control is likely a core facet of the self 
which even as it is partly shaped by culture, appears to be universally linked to 
psychological adjustment. 
From our perspective, perceived control is a core component of the self, which 
influences many aspects of subjective experience, including subjective social status. The 
position we are taking here is one that contrasts with the conceptual framework advanced 
by Kraus and colleagues (2009), which is the most definitive theoretical statement to date 
on the relation between subjective status and perceived control. In their account, 
subjective status was construed as a part of individuals’ core identity and perceived 
control was seen as a cultural trait which is influenced by that identity. Implicit in their 
conceptualization is that subjective status is psychologically primary and of greater 
importance than perceived control. However, the influence of subjective status may have 
been overstated, especially in contrast to the powerful influence of perceived control in 
people’s lives. 
 Perceived control was linked to neuroticism in the present studies and no direct 
path remained between neuroticism and subjective status in Figure 4. However, the 
model was largely equivalent to one in which neuroticism directly predicted Time 1 
subjective status. One interpretation of this equivalence is that neuroticism and perceived 
control are strongly linked constructs which both act in unison to shape subjective status. 
In prior research (Alfonsi et al., 2011), the pathways linking greater neuroticism to lower 
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subjective status were via lower occupational attainment, lower income, and greater 
illness. In addition, neuroticism had a direct impact on subjective status and the present 
findings suggest that this influence may be due in part to perceived control. Interestingly, 
Alfonsi and colleagues (2011) found that the effects of neuroticism on subjective status 
were not mediated by negative affect, which is ironic given that most prior research on 
subjective status and various health outcomes has controlled for negative affect (Adler et 
al., 2000; Operario et al., 2004). The broader question is how personality influences 
different types of affective experience, how personality influences subjective status, and 
how affective states may influence subjective status. Extraversion was shown in Alfonsi 
and colleagues (2011) and in the present research to be linked to subjective status, and as 
noted above, more extraverted individuals reliably experience more positive affect and 
well-being. As well, more positive affect has been linked to greater subjective status 
(Alfonsi et al., 2011). Positive affect may partly mediate the impact of extraversion on 
subjective status. 
The present finding in which higher perceived control predicts higher subjective 
status seems at odds with the one experimental study reported by Kraus and colleagues 
(2009) in their research on subjective status and perceived control – their other studies 
were cross-sectional. In their experimental study, a manipulation of perceived control did 
not result in a change in subjective status, even as it influenced the dependent measure, 
which was degree of influence by contextual factors in participants’ judgments of facial 
displays of emotion. However, this null finding may be due to inadequate power. The 
influence of perceived control on subjective status is small, as documented here and in 
prior cross-sectional research (Kraus et al., 2009; Lundberg & Kristenson, 2008; Singh-
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Manoux et al., 2003), and a test for such an experimental effect requires a very large 
sample size to have adequate power. As such, definitive conclusions cannot readily be 
drawn from the experimental study reported by Kraus and colleagues. 
 The present studies have two principal limitations. First, the studies are 
correlational. Nevertheless, Study 2 was longitudinal, and such designs are better suited 
to identify causal relations (Bergman et al., 1994). Second, both studies had samples with 
somewhat higher SES than the community at large. Personality factors have been shown 
to have more influence with individuals of higher SES (W. Johnson & Krueger, 2006). 
As such, a lower SES sample may have shown even smaller effects between neuroticism, 
extraversion, perceived control, and subjective status. 
There was no association between subjective status and perceived control in 
Study 1, and subjective status did not determine perceived control in Study 2. In previous 
work, when controlling for personality, subjective status did not predict illness or 
negative affect (Alfonsi et al., 2011). Taken with the present research, the conclusion 
seems to be that the impact of lower subjective status may have been overstated in 
previous cross-sectional research that did not control for personality. Note that nearly all 
prior research on subjective status has been cross-sectional in nature, which raises further 
questions about the commonly adopted view that lower subjective status causes various 
deleterious health outcomes. Furthermore, doubts have been raised about the importance 
of subjective status independent of its determinants such as SES. For instance, there 
appears to be little benefit to health for employees with higher titles in their workplace if 
those titles do not offer greater objective economic rewards (Macleod et al., 2005). 
Presumably, those individuals with higher titles would in turn see themselves as having 
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higher social rank, and yet it was actual material resources such as access to a car that 
most strongly predicted better health. In sum, the present research highlights once again 
the wide ranging influence of core aspects of personality. In particular, neuroticism and 
perceived control loom large.  
When is having higher status important? As noted above, having higher status in 
one’s proximal social environment is not everyone’s priority (Josephs et al., 2006), but it 
likely remains that if a certain type of status is more important to people, it is likely to be 
such proximal status, as opposed to one’s status in society at large. Research with 
adolescents’ levels of cortisol (which is a major physiological measure of stress) supports 
the distinction between more global status from status in proximal social environments. 
With adolescents, SES was largely unrelated to cortisol levels whereas the adolescents’ 
rankings in more immediate social hierarchies (i.e., academics, sports, peer rankings) was 
related to cortisol levels in different ways for each hierarchy (West et al., 2010). The 
evidence of the physiological impact of lower subjective status is less clear. Wright and 
Steptoe (2005) did find a link between lower subjective status and higher cortisol on 
awakening in the elderly, but did not control for neuroticism – even though higher 
neuroticism has been linked to greater cortisol levels (Nater et al., 2010). As such, it 
remains an open question whether subjective status itself is as psychologically salient and 
important as individuals’ status in their immediate social groups. One possibility is that 
subjective status may matter most when it becomes salient that one’s position in society 
is directly linked to important and desirable outcomes. In everyday circumstances, people 
may have system-justifying beliefs (Jost & Banaji, 1994), which could lead them to 
downplay the significance of status differences. It may be that it is when individuals 
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perceive their lower status as an expression of injustice that subjective status may have it 
most pronounced effects on the individual. Although some research of this type has been 
conducted (Franzini & Fernandez-Esquer, 2006), it remains important to take personality 












In the present studies, subjective status did not negatively impact individuals’ 
subsequent physical health or adjustment after taking into account personality and 
previous health. These findings are in sharp contrast with the extensive literature 
reviewed above. However, none of the previous research reviewed above which found a 
link between subjective status and health outcomes controlled for personality, and few 
studies controlled for initial health (for an exception, see Operario et al., 2004). In 
contrast to subjective status, which appeared relatively inconsequential in the present 
research, personality appeared to have a wide range of effects. For example, older adults 
who were higher in neuroticism had lower occupational attainment, lower salaries, 
greater negative affect, lower perceived control, and lower subjective status. In addition, 
both extraversion (with both young and older adults) and perceived control (with older 
adults alone) were positively associated with subjective status, and perceived control with 
financial satisfaction as well. That neuroticism, and the closely linked perceived control 
(Judge et al., 2002), as well as extraversion would have such a range of effects is broadly 
consistent with previous research reviewed above that highlights the influence of these 
core dimensions of personality. 
Note that one very recent study, which was published after the present studies 
were completed, did consider neuroticism alongside subjective status. In this study 
(Cundiff, Smith, Uchino, & Berg, 2011), neuroticism was controlled for in a model of 
subjective status and marital adjustment for husbands and wives. The study examined 
whether subjective status was linked to how individuals viewed their spouses and how 
these perceptions might predict depression and marital satisfaction. The findings were 
100 
that spouses with higher subjective status perceived their mates as less dominant and 
warmer, and in turn, were seen by their mates as being more dominant and warmer 
(though being perceived as warmer was found only for the men). These interpersonal 
perceptions had consequences on how depressed each member of the couple was. The 
researchers included neuroticism as a control and reported that the associations between 
subjective status and interpersonal perceptions remained significant.  
However, there were two principal limitations with this study. First, the authors 
did not compare their model to an alternative account in which interpersonal perceptions 
of warmth and dominance determine subjective status. As was argued above, individuals 
may be influenced by their face to face status (presumably related to interpersonal 
perceptions of dominance) in how they assess their subjective status. Given that this 
alternative account was not tested, and the cross-sectional nature of the data, questions 
can be raised as to whether subjective status is a determinant or an outcome of 
interpersonal perception. The second limitation was that the authors did not report any 
quantitative data when controlling for neuroticism. As a result, it remains unclear how 
much variance was accounted for by neuroticism, even if significant relations remained 
between subjective status and interpersonal behaviors. Nonetheless, the study represents 
an improvement in subjective status research, in that personality was considered. 
The present research suggests that subjective status may not be as influential as 
previously argued. One principal reason why subjective status may not be as 
consequential as thought is that individuals differ in how much they value status. For 
example, it has been argued that there are 10 major value domains that are relatively 
consistent across cultures (Schwartz, 1992, 1994). Only one of these value domains is 
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directly related to the pursuit of status and prestige, and is labeled the power domain. 
Given that there are individual differences in what people value, the implication is that 
for some people, status concerns may simply be less important. Research on values 
within work settings supports this conclusion. For some individuals, the primary motive 
to work is the pursuit of prestige and extrinsic rewards (i.e., higher income), but for 
others, the opportunity to socialize, or to be competent or creative may be their primary 
motive to work (Ros, Schwartz, & Surkiss, 1999). In addition, it appears that higher 
status may be particularly consequential only for individuals who value status. In a study 
of older adults, it was only those individuals who valued self-enhancement (a construct 
that encompasses valuing prestige, power, success and admiration) who showed a 
positive relation between financial status and positive affect (Burr, Santo, & Pushkar, 
2011). Individuals who did not particularly value prestige and power did not show a 
relation between mood and financial status. 
In addition, there may be negative consequences to the pursuit of status, 
especially as it may interfere with the fulfillment of core psychological needs. Self-
determination theory (Ryan & Deci, 2000) posits three basic human needs which are 
required for human flourishing: competence, relatedness, and autonomy. Together, these 
three needs are satisfied through the formation of what are labeled intrinsic life goals. 
These are differentiated from extrinsic life goals (i.e., money, prestige, and other status 
concerns), the pursuit of which may actually be linked to worse adjustment (Kasser & 
Ryan, 1996). Research conducted with college students show that those individuals who 
placed more importance on extrinsic attainments did in fact achieve greater success in 
these domains after graduation but actually fared worse psychologically, whereas those 
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who placed greater emphasis on intrinsic goals went on to have higher well-being 
(Niemiec, Ryan, & Deci, 2009). The findings linking higher intrinsic satisfaction with 
well-being appear to be robust, and hold cross-culturally (Lekes, Gingras, Philippe, 
Koestner, & Fang, 2010). As such, not only do individuals differ in how much they 
pursue status, but it may be those individuals who pursue status the most who are at risk 
for poor adjustment. 
There may be circumstances in which subjective status could have important 
consequences. Perhaps perceptions of one’s own social rank will be more consequential 
under circumstances in which class differences are salient. For example, students of 
lower SES background at an elite American university may struggle with maintaining  
desired self-presentation (S. E. Johnson, Richeson, & Finkel, 2011). Environments such 
as that of a prestigious university may keep one’s subjective status present in mind for 
lower SES individuals, and it can be hypothesized that it is when individuals with lower 
subjective status are constantly reminded of their lower rank, that they are at most risk for 
poorer health. Note that status-salient environments may have their effects because 
subjective status becomes linked to valued social outcomes within these environments. 
Consider what socializing might be like for students attending a prestigious university. In 
interpersonal exchanges, one may be judged based on one’s accent, one’s family 
background, one’s taste and style, and so on. The ultimate consequences of failing to live 
up to class-linked social norms may be interpersonal exclusion and loss of respect. As a 
result, subjective status still is not particularly consequential in its own right, but only 
when it becomes linked to face to face status. 
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 Another possibility is that subjective status will be more consequential in 
countries which possess greater income inequality. One reason this might be the case is 
that perhaps individuals who live in countries with greater class differences may appraise 
their relative SES ranking more in terms of fairness. Individuals with lower subjective 
status in countries with large class differences may perceive their situation as unfair. This 
perceived unfairness may lead to chronic stress and in turn, poorer health (Jackson, 
Kubzansky, & Wright, 2006). The current research was conducted in Canada, which has 
generally lower income inequality when compared to the United States (United Nations 
Development Programme, 2009), and it was in the United States in which much of the 
research reviewed above on subjective status was conducted. Perhaps in a Canadian 
sample, individuals are relatively less likely to perceive their social ranking in terms of 
fairness and as such, subjective status has less influence on health outcomes. In contrast, 
societies with very large class differences might experience even greater health effects 
related to subjective status than has been observed with American samples.  
 Note that a variety of other variables besides personality and health may play a 
role in shaping subjective status. For example, it may be the case that social support is 
important, with those individuals who have larger social networks seeing themselves as 
having higher social rank. Another important variable may be neighborhood SES. 
Individuals may assess their rank by contrasting their own SES against the SES of their 
neighbours. Indeed, Adler and colleagues (2000) argue along these lines. Future research 
could consider contrasting the role of neighbourhood SES as well as social support, with 
that of personality and previous health in shaping how individuals assess their status. 
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 In the present studies, personality traits such as neuroticism and extraversion were 
highly influential. In particular, individuals who are higher in neuroticism and lower in 
extraversion seem to fare badly. Yet the broader picture for these personality differences 
is more nuanced. Research on personality disorders indicates that high neuroticism and 
low extraversion are not always risk factors. Consider the results of a meta-analysis on 
the relation between core aspects of personality and psychopathology (Samuel & 
Widiger, 2008). Individuals with histrionic personality disorder, which includes excessive 
emotionality and chronic attention seeking (American Psychiatric Association [DSM-IV-
TR], 2000), tend to have higher extraversion. As well, lower neuroticism offers little 
protection for either anti-social or obsessive compulsive personality disorders. 
Nevertheless, the big picture does remain that there is a great deal of evidence for the 
negative consequences of neuroticism (Roberts et al., 2007), and for the positive 
consequences of extraversion.  
Why then do human beings demonstrate such a range of individual differences on 
neuroticism and extraversion? One approach to answering this question is to consider 
human personality differences from the perspective of evolutionary psychology. The 
affective and behavioral tendencies present in neuroticism and extraversion can be seen 
as adaptations which lead the individual to maximize reproductive success. For example, 
extraversion has been conceptualized as an adaption designed to orient individuals to 
potential social rewards (Campbell, Simpson, Stewart, & Manning, 2003), and 
neuroticism’s principal adaptive function may be to provide hypervigilance to threats, 
particularly of social exclusion (Denissen & Penke, 2008). However, if neuroticism and 
extraversion are adaptive, then it has been argued that the genes underlying these traits 
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should be highly homogenous across individuals (Hiraishi, Yamagata, Shikishima, & 
Ando, 2008). Given this argument, it appears paradoxical that there is substantial 
variability in our species for both these traits (Hiraishi et al., 2008). A variety of 
responses have been provided to address this apparent paradox. First, natural selection 
may tolerate a substantial degree of variation for a particular psychological trait, as long 
as the individual possesses the trait at some level (Kanazawa, 2010). For example, 
possessing some degree of the psychological mechanisms underlying extraversion and 
neuroticism may be adaptive, even if these mechanisms may differ in their sensitivity 
across individuals. Second, perhaps the optimal level for a characteristic is dependent on 
the immediate physical and social environment of the individual (Nettle, 2006). For 
example, it may be the case that for individuals born into particularly dangerous 
environments, there may be a benefit to the increased vigilance and caution of higher 
neuroticism. Given that the optimal fitness level for either extraversion or neuroticism 
may change given environmental factors, then it would be expected that significant 
diversity of profiles would be preserved for these personality traits.  
The evolutionary account for individual differences in personality nevertheless 
leaves unresolved the fate of individuals who have a genetic make up predisposing them 
to high neuroticism and low extraversion. There is nevertheless the possibility of change 
in personality for an individual. A variety of treatments that have been developed to 
address psychopathology could also lead to change in core personality. For example, 
cognitive-behavioral therapy may have an impact on extraversion and neuroticism. In a 
study of individuals with social anxiety, a brief course of cognitive-behavioral therapy 
resulted in significant decreases in neuroticism and increases in extraversion (Glinski & 
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Page, 2010). In addition, newer psychotherapeutic approaches such as mindfulness-based 
approaches may also influence personality. A recent study suggests that behavioral 
manifestations of neuroticism such as impulsivity and poor self-control are mediated by 
lower mindfulness (Fetterman, Robinson, Ode, & Gordon, 2010). Perhaps interventions 
designed to boost mindfulness would in turn decrease the negative behaviors associated 
with high neuroticism. As with psychotherapeutic approaches, psychopharmacological 
treatments may also influence personality. For example, depressed patients given 
selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) showed increased extraversion and 
decreased neuroticism when compared to a placebo control group (Tang et al., 2009). In 
fact, the anti-depressant effects of SSRIs may be explained by the reduced neuroticism of 
the treated individuals (Quilty, Meusel, & Bagby, 2008). In sum, there a variety of 
treatment options for individuals with very high neuroticism and very low extraversion, 
which may be warranted if extreme levels on these traits result in significant impairment. 
The importance of personality for adjustment and well-being may be a function of 
social, cultural, and historical factors. For example, the influence of personality on well-
being will appear larger if one considers the wealthier strata of those living in wealthier 
countries (W. Johnson & Krueger, 2006). This greater influence of personality may 
reflect the curvilinear relation between socioeconomic conditions and well-being which 
has been identified in cross-cultural and historical analyses (Inglehart, Foa, Peterson, & 
Welzel, 2008). Beyond a threshold of wealth, further economic gains appear to offer little 
gain in terms of well-being, and as such whatever variance in well-being that remains 
will be determined by genetic factors underlying personality (Weiss et al., 2008). 
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However, below that threshold, such as for those individuals living in poverty, material 
deprivation may negatively determine well-being. 
As Macleod and colleagues have argued (2005), social status research is 
inevitably political as it touches upon key issues in public policy. As such, a variety of 
public policies may find support in some of the research discussed above. First, there are 
good grounds to attempt to improve the material conditions of individuals of lower SES. 
There are a variety of negative consequences for individuals living with limited income 
(see American Psychological Association, 2006). Second, public policy should be 
directly concerned with those individuals with a mental illness that may reflect extremely 
high neuroticism or extremely low extraversion. One solution is to provide readily 
available and affordable mental health services. Such services have the capacity to 
modulate personality to some extent. Third, given the importance of intrinsic needs (i.e., 
relatedness, competence, and autonomy) to well-being, public policy should aim towards 
maximizing a wider range of human goods than the typical economic indicators currently 
used to assess policy (see Diener & Seligman, 2004 for a more complete discussion of 
these arguments). In sum, public policy is best off recognizing that a flourishing life 
requires material security and not necessarily material wealth, and that above and beyond 
a certain level, well-being is a consequence of what kind of personality one has and the 
quality of one’s goals and activities. 
Given the relatively influential role that personality played in the present studies 
compared to the weaker role of subjective status, one can question the predictive utility of 
subjective status. In fact, if one includes previous health and SES alongside personality as 
control variables, subjective status appears to have little predictive power for future 
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physical health and adjustment. Note that there may be several possible conditions 
discussed above in which subjective status might offer some unique predictive power, 
such as in status-salient environments or in countries with high income inequality. 
However, the enhanced effects of subjective status under these conditions have yet to be 
empirically demonstrated. It can be argued that the importance of subjective status 
remains undetermined. Indeed, as it stands now, subjective status can be argued to be an 
epiphenomenal manifestation of the individual’s SES, personality, and health. As an 
epiphenomenon, subjective status does not influence other constructs in its own right and 
the inclusion of subjective status in theories of adjustment may not be parsimonious. In 
sum, the view that subjective status is important needs further support to surmount these 
challenges. 
In the present thesis, SES was operationalized in terms of education, occupational 
prestige, and salary just prior to retirement for a sample of recent retirees, and in terms of 
parental education for a sample of young adults. As mentioned in the general 
introduction, there is some controversy as to how to best operationalize SES. For the 
recent retirees, education, occupation, and income just prior to retirement were chosen as 
indicators of SES on account of these indicators likely having lasting effects on 
individuals’ SES as they progress through retirement, and on their principal role in 
defining SES more generally (Rogers & Onge, 2007). For young adults, parental 
education is likely to be an important component of a young adult’s SES, and was used in 
prior research on subjective status and perceived control (Kraus et al., 2009). Note that a 
variety of alternative measures of SES are available (see Oakes & Rossi, 2003). 
However, it is unclear whether alternative measures of SES would have led to 
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significantly different results. In the present thesis, there remained little association 
between subjective status and a host of outcome variables after accounting for 
personality, health, and the current operationalizations of SES.   
The present studies have three principal limitations. First, the studies in Chapter 2 
and 3 as well as Study 2 of Chapter 4 were based on the same sample of recent retirees. 
Each study examined a different set of variables from within the longitudinal project, but 
the participants were the same. As such, this places a limit on the generalizability of the 
results. Study 3 did examine a very different sample, one composed of undergraduates, to 
provide greater external validity. However, more studies are needed with a diversity of 
samples. A second limitation is that much of the present research examines directionality 
between constructs but does not use an experimental design. The use of longitudinal data 
in three studies and comparisons with alternative models do provide some support for the 
directional accounts argued above. However, these methods do not definitively establish 
directionality. The main difficulty in using an experimental approach is that the 
constructs under question (i.e., personality and previous health) are not easily 
amenable to experimental intervention. Longitudinal methods may therefore be the best 
available option. Finally, a third limitation is that the longitudinal measures used in the 
present thesis were taken over a few years, and it can be argued that if the studies had 
followed the participants for longer periods of time, then perhaps subjective status would 
have been more consequential. Replication of the present findings with longitudinal 
studies over 5 or 10 year periods would strengthen the conclusions being drawn in the 
present thesis. 
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 In the present studies, subjective status was influenced by personality and 
previous health, and subjective status did not predict subsequent negative affect, poor 
health, perceived control, or financial satisfaction after accounting for these background 
factors. Several lines of future research have been suggested above in which subjective 
status may still be influential in the right context. Other topics remain to be addressed by 
future research.  For instance, it has been shown that neuroticism and extraversion are 
predictive of face to face status. If so, then one could predict that neuroticism and 
extraversion may predict a variety of status-related behaviors such as assertive and 
submissive behavior. In the present research, neuroticism had a relatively complex 
relation with subjective status, occurring through multiple pathways, and neuroticism 
may also be linked in complex ways to assertiveness and submissiveness. Neuroticism 
may extend its influence over how individuals relate face to face through one’s SES, 
illness, mood, and other possible routes. As with subjective status, face to face status may 
prove to be powerfully under the grip of personality. 
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Consent Form for Retirement Study 
 
This is to state that I, _________________________________, agree to participate in the 
study on retirement being conducted by Drs. Pushkar, Conway, Li, and Wrosch from the 
Centre for Research in Human Development and the Department of Psychology at 
Concordia University. 
 
I have been informed that: 
 
1. My participation in this study entails my completing a battery of questionnaires, 
including questionnaires about the activities I do, my physical health, as well as 
about various life domains including my well-being, memory, cognition, and my 
attitudes. 
2. All information about me or any other person will remain completely confidential. 
Results from this study will be accessible only to the researchers involved in this 
study. They will be able to use the information for scientific purposes, such as for 
publications in scientific journals or presentations at scientific conferences, as 
long as I cannot be identified as a participant in this study. 
3. I am free to withdraw my consent and discontinue my participation at anytime 
without negative consequences. 
4. This interview should last approximately four hours. I will receive a monetary 
compensation of $50 for the four hours. 
5. Because this study is a longitudinal study, I may be contacted again for an annual 
interview in 2006, 2007, and 2008. Each annual interview will last approximately 
four hours. I will receive $50 for each annual interview in which I will take part.  
6. I will receive a copy of the general results as they become available if I have 
indicated my name and address on the previous page. 
7. I understand the purpose of this study; I know that there is no deception involved. 
8. The person in charge of this study is Dr. Dolores Pushkar. She can be reached at 
(514) 848-2424, extension 7540, email: retraite@alcor.concordia.ca 
 
I HAVE CAREFULLY STUDIED THE ABOVE AND UNDERSTAND THIS 
AGREEEMENT. I FREELY CONSENT AND VOLUNTARILY AGREE TO 
PARTICIPATE. 
 
 Name (please print):_______________________________ 
 Signature:_______________________________________ 
 Date: __________________________________________ 
 Witness:________________________________________ 
 
If at any time you have questions about your rights as a research participant, please 
contact Adela Reid, Research Ethics and Compliance Officer, Concordia University, at 




Subjective Status Scale (Modified for Recent Retirees) 
 
Think of this ladder as representing where people stand in our society. At the top of the 
ladder are the people who are the best off: those who have the most money, who are the 
most educated, and who have/had the best jobs. At the bottom of the ladder are the people 
who are the worst off: those who have the least money, who are the least educated, and 
who have/had the worst jobs. Note that for this question, we are referring to the job from 
which you retired. Please place an X on the step that best represents where you think you 
now stand on the ladder. 




















The following questions deal with specific illnesses or conditions that people may have. 
Please check those symptoms or illnesses you have experienced in the last year. 
□ 1. Headache □ 43. Alcoholism □ 85. Lung problems 
□ 2. Dizziness □ 44. Drug addiction □ 86. Balance  problems 
□ 3. Varicose veins □ 45. Cirrhosis of the liver □ 87. Dental  problems 
□ 4. Hemorrhoids □ 46. Parkinson’s □ 88. Incontinence 
□ 5. Low blood pressure □ 47. Blindness □ 89. Colon  problems 
□ 6. Drug allergy □ 48. Stroke □ 90. Skin infections 
□ 7. Bronchitis □ 49. Muscular dystrophy □ 91. Neurological  problems 
□ 8. Hyperventilation □ 50. Cerebral palsy □ 92. Sciatica 
□ 9. Bursitis □ 51. Heart failure □ 93. Sinusitis/Sinus infection 
□ 10. Lumbago □ 52. Heart attack □ 94. Manic depression 
□ 11. Migraine □ 53. Brain infection □ 95. Vitiligo 
□ 12. Hernia □ 54. Multiple sclerosis □ 96. Hearing  problems 
□ 13. Irregular heart beats □ 55. Bleeding brain □ 97. Persistent backache 
□ 14. Overweight/Obesity □ 56. Uremia □ 98. Insomnia 
□ 15. Anemia □ 57. Cancer □ 99. Addison’s disease 
□ 16. Anxiety reaction □ 58. Leukemia □ 100. Fibromyalgia 
□ 17. Gout □ 59. Cataracts □ 101. Raynaud’s Disease 
□ 18. Pneumonia □ 60. Difficulty with vision □ 102. Blood disorder 
□ 19. Depression □ 61. Rheumatism □ 103. Hypoglycemia 
□ 20. Kidney/Urinary infection □ 62. Uterine/Breast fibroids □ 104. Spinal Disc Degeneration 
□ 21. Sexual intercourse difficulties □ 63. Breast inflammation □ 105. Rosacea 
□ 22. Thyroid problems □ 64. Pelvic inflammation □ 106. Burnout 
□ 23. Asthma □ 65. Vaginal Infection    
□ 24. Glaucoma □ 66. Cyst 
→ 
Please list any OTHER  
□ 25. Gallstones □ 67. Other symptoms or illnesses that 
□ 26. Arthritis/Osteoarthritis □ 68. Color Blindness that you have experienced  
□ 27. Slipped disk □ 69. Tendonitis   in the last year: 
□ 28. Hepatitis □ 70. Cardiomyopathy    
□ 29. Kidney stones □ 71. Prostate problems    
□ 30. Peptic ulcer □ 72. Shingles    
□ 31. Pancreatitis □ 73. Degeneration of the eye    
□ 32. High blood pressure □ 74. Chicken Pox    
□ 33. Deafness □ 75. Cholesterol Problems    
□ 34. Collapsed lung □ 76. Internal Bleeding    
□ 35. Epilepsy □ 77. Allergies/hives    
□ 36. Chest pain □ 78. Osteoporosis    
□ 37. Nervous breakdown □ 79. Gastric Reflux/ Gastroenteritis    
□ 38. Diabetes □ 80. Psoriasis/Eczema    
□ 39. Blood clots □ 81. Sleep Apnea    
□ 40. Hardening arteries □ 82. Carpal Tunnel Syndrome    
□ 41. Emphysema □ 83. Muscle/Ligament/Tendon tear    
□ 42. Tuberculosis □ 84. Angina    
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Appendix D 
Demographics Questionnaire for Recent Retirees 
1. What is your sex? Male___________ Female___________ 
2. What is the date of your birth?  
  Year_________ Month _________ Date____ 
3. What is your age? ___________ 
4. What is the highest level of education you have completed?  
        (Please circle that which corresponds best) 
Primary School: 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Secondary School: 7 8 9 10 11 12 
CEGEP/College: Diploma     
University: Bachelor’s Master’s Doctorate 
 
  Other (please indicate what, how many years) ________________________ 
5. What is your occupation? 
_____________________________________________________ 
6. When did you retire?   
Year___________ Month ___________ Date_____ 
7. How many years were you employed?  ______________________________ 
8. Do you receive a pension from your employer?  
     Yes_____ No_____ 
9. At the time of your retirement, what was your annual salary? 
_______________________________ 
10. What is your present annual income (include all sources, e.g. RRSP’s, etc.) 
_______________________________ 
11. What is your total family income from all sources? 
_______________________________ 
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12. Compared to other people of your age that you know, how would you rate your 
financial situation? 
(Please circle the corresponding number) 
1) A lot worse than most 
2) Worse than most 
3) A little worse than most 
4) About the same as most 
5) A little better than most 
6) Better than most 
7) A lot better than most 
13. What languages do you speak? 
French__________ 
English_________ 
Other (please specify): ______________________ 
14. What language do you read and write? 
French__________ 
English_________ 
Other (please specify): ______________________ 
15. What is your civil status? 
Married                   __________ 
Single                     __________ 
Divorced                __________ 
Widowed               __________ 
Common-law         __________ 
16. How many times have you been married? _________ 
17. Do you have children?    Yes_____ No_____ 
18. If yes, how many girls? _____    
How many boys? _____ 
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19. Who do you live with?  
Alone                            ___________ 
Spouse                          ___________ 
Brother/Sister               ___________ 
Friend                           ___________ 
Children                       ___________ 
Other (please specify)  ___________ 






Consent to Access Information Form 
 
This is to state that I, _________________________________, agree to allow the 
researchers from the Centre for Research in Human Development and the Department of 
Psychology at Concordia University to obtain the following data, where applicable, from 
the Régie de l’Assurance Maladie de Québec and the Ministère de la Santé et des 
Services Sociaux. 
 
 For the period of January 01 2000 to December 31 2009 inclusively: 
 
 Régie de l’Assurance Maladie de Québec  
(Medical and pharmaceutical information) 
 
1. identification number 
2. sex 
3. age at the time of the act 
4. act code 
5. act date 
6. institution code 
7. speciality code 
8. diagnosis 
9. plan code (prescription drug insurance) 
10. plan eligibility period 
11. medication type (code DIN, code de dénomination commune, code de classe) 
 
Ministère de la Santé et des Services Sociaux 
 (Information about hospital stays) 
 
1. identification number 
2. admission and release dates 
3. admission diagnosis 
4. primary diagnosis 
5. secondary diagnosis 
6. treatment code 
7. type of destination 
8. type of death 
 
I have been informed that all information about me or any other person will remain 
confidential. Results from this study will be accessible only to the researchers involved in 
this study. They will be able to use the information for scientific purposes, such as for 
publications in scientific journals, or presentations at scientific conferences, as long as I 
cannot be identified as a participant. 
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I HAVE CAREFULLY STUDIED THE ABOVE AND UNDERSTAND THIS 
AGREEEMENT. I FREELY CONSENT AND VOLUNTARILY AGREE TO 
PARTICIPATE. 
 
Name (please print):_______________________________ 
 










Consent Form for Study 1 of Chapter 4 
Dr. Michael Conway and his research associates from the Psychology Department at 
Concordia University are conducting a project involving a series of questionnaires. The 
information is to be used to develop research measures and to identify individuals who 
might be eligible to participate in paid, future research studies. In exchange for 
completing the packet of questionnaires, you will become eligible for a drawing that will 
award one $150 prize, one $100 prize and two $50 prizes. Furthermore, you will receive 
one gift card worth 2.50$ redeemable at participating Tim Hortons. 
 
The main requirement is that you complete all the questionnaires in the packet. 
 
Please note that this project involves the following: 
 
(1) Eligibility for the drawing and gift card is established when the fully completed 
packet is returned to the project personnel. 
 
(2) All questionnaires must be completed at this table. For most people, this will 
require approximately 15 minutes. 
 
(3) All information from this project is confidential. Your identity is protected by a 
numerical coding system. 
 
(4) You are free to examine the packet of questionnaires before signing this form. 
You are also free to withdraw from the study at any time. However, eligibility for 
prizes and gift cards is based on full completion of all questionnaires. 
 
(5) Project staff members will be able to answer questions you may have about 
completing the questionnaires. However, no specific explanation for the purpose 
of a particular questionnaire will be provided. 
 
(6) Any questions or concerns about the project can be directed to Dr. Michael 
Conway (514-848-2424 ext. 7541; Michael.Conway@concordia.ca) at the 
Psychology Department. In addition, he may contact you about your responses or 
about participation in a future study if you provide information which will allow 
telephone contact. 
 
(7) It is important that you respond honestly to all questionnaire items. 
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"I have read the above and agree to participate in the Fall 2010 Assessment Project 
conducted by Dr. Michael Conway." 
 
___________________________________          _______________________ 
                  Participant’s Signature                                                Date 
 
Any questions about ethics and this research? Contact Dr. Brigitte Des Rosiers, Acting 





Subjective Status Scale for Study 1 of Chapter 4 
 
Think of this 10-step ladder as representing where people stand in Canadian society. At 
the top of the ladder are the people who are the best off: those who have the most money, 
who are the most educated, and who have the most respected jobs. At the bottom of the 
ladder are the people who are the worst off: those who have the least money, who are the 
least educated, and who have the least respected jobs. Please place an X on the step that 
best represents where you think you stand on the ladder currently. 
 


















Contextual Explanations Scale 
 
Below is a series of positive and negative events. Please consider whether the people 
affected by each of these events are responsible for the events, or whether the events are 
caused by external forces outside of the individual’s control. For each event, please 
indicate where you think the responsibility generally lies.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Individual 
is  100% 
responsible 
Individual 
is  85% 
responsible 
Individual 




















A. Getting into a good university professional program (e.g., MBA) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 B. Having low income 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
C. Getting good medical care 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
D. Contracting a sexually transmitted disease  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
E. Getting a full-time job at a prestigious company 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
F. Failing a class at school 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
G. Being overweight 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
H. Having to put in extra hours at work 





Demographics Questionnaire for Young Adults 
 
1. Your age:_____    
2. Gender: __Male __Female 
3. To which ethnic or cultural group do you belong, according to these  
    Census Canada categories? (Check one) 
 
__Arab  __Black __Chinese  
__South Asian (e.g., East Indian, Pakistani, Sri Lankan) 
__White __Filipino __Korean  
__Southeast Asian (e.g., Cambodian, Indonesian, Laotian, Vietnamese) 
__Japanese   __Latin American        __West Asian (e.g., Afghan, Iranian) 
__Other (please specify):________________ 
4. How many years have you resided in Canada? 
 ___ years    or    ___my whole life 
5. What languages do you speak most often: 
At home? ___________________   
Outside the home? ____________________ 
6. What language did you speak most often in elementary school? ____________ 
7. Program of study (e.g., Sociology, Engineering, Film Studies): _____________ 
8. Year of university study (e.g., 1st, 2nd, 3rd…):_________________________ 
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9. What is your father’s level of education? Check one. 
__Primary __Secondary __Technical degree/CEGEP  
__University (specify): __undergraduate or __graduate (e.g., MA) 
10. What is your mother’s level of education? Check one. 
__Primary __Secondary __Technical degree/CEGEP  
__University (specify): __undergraduate or __graduate (e.g., MA) 
11. How many siblings do you have? ________________ 
12. Relative to your siblings, when were you born? Check one. 
____ Only child          ____ First-born          ____ Second-born          ____ Third-born or later       
 
 
 
 
